People v. Atienza
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Damaso Atienza was charged with grave oral defamation in the Municipal Court of Cagayan de Oro City upon a sworn complaint signed by the offended party, Pilar Lee. The defamatory words allegedly uttered were: "Pauli na, puta ka. Oo, puta ka puta kat bilaw," translated as "Go home, you prostitute. Yes, you are a prostitute, really a prostitute." Procedural History: After the defendant pleaded not guilty and the trial was well advanced, with only the sur-rebuttal witness for the defense yet to be presented, the defense counsel moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The motion was based on the argument that the case was prosecuted upon a complaint signed by the offended party instead of an information signed by the prosecuting officer, contending that the imputed crime of prostitution is a public crime requiring prosecution by information. The Petition: The People of the Philippines appealed the order of dismissal issued by the Municipal Court.
Issue(s)
Whether a criminal action for grave oral defamation, where the imputation is a crime that can be prosecuted de officio, can be validly commenced by a complaint signed by the offended party, or exclusively by an information signed by the prosecuting officer. Whether the technical objection regarding the form of the complaint, raised at a late stage of the trial with the public prosecutor's active involvement, should be deemed waived.
Ruling
The order of dismissal is set aside, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Costs are against the defendant-appellee.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the lower court misapprehended Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code. This provision states that "No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de officio shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party." The Court clarified that this provision's purpose is to make the offended party's complaint indispensable for crimes that cannot be prosecuted de officio (like adultery, concubinage, rape), but it does not prohibit or constrict the prosecution of defamation cases involving crimes that can be prosecuted de officio (public crimes) when initiated by a complaint filed by the offended party. Citing Balite vs. People, the Court emphasized that a reasonable construction would not allow writing into the statute an alien concept that would exclude criminal action started by a complaint for de officio crimes. Thus, prosecution for grave oral defamation imputing a public crime, like prostitution, may proceed upon a complaint filed by the offended party. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court found a misapprehension of fact on the part of the lower court. Firstly, the Court noted that the word "puta" (prostitute) does not necessarily equate to the crime of prostitution as strictly defined in Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code, which requires engaging in habitual sexual intercourse for money. The lower court's automatic assumption was therefore flawed. Secondly, the Court highlighted that while the complaint was signed by the offended party, it was also signed by the special counsel acting as a public prosecutor, who maintained supervision and control of the case and actively participated in the trial, including cross-examining defense witnesses and presenting rebuttal witnesses. Under these circumstances, and given that the technical objection was raised at a very late stage of the trial, it should have been deemed waived. Procedural technicalities should not be used to defeat justice when the spirit of the law, which is to ensure proper prosecution by the State, has been substantially complied with and the defense has participated without timely objection.
Main Doctrine
A criminal action for defamation, even if it imputes a crime that can be prosecuted de officio, may be initiated by a complaint filed by the offended party, especially when the complaint is also signed by a public prosecutor. Furthermore, a technical objection to the mode of initiating the action should be deemed waived if raised at a late stage of the proceedings.