Cañete v. Amban
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Private respondent Ganlay Amban filed a complaint for possession and damages against petitioners Federico Cañete and Pedro Rudas. Amban alleged that in May 1957, Cañete leased five hectares of his eight-hectare land, agreeing to pay P50.00 per hectare annually. Amban claimed that in 1958, Cañete refused to pay the rentals and asserted ownership. Petitioner Rudas was impleaded as Cañete's tenant. Petitioners, in their answer, claimed that Cañete had purchased the five-hectare portion in 1953, with the deed executed in 1955. Procedural History: The case proceeded to trial, but petitioners and their counsel failed to appear on October 18, 1962. The court allowed the plaintiff (Amban) to present evidence ex parte. On November 23, 1962, the lower court rendered a decision finding that Cañete, a school teacher, fraudulently induced Amban, an unlettered non-Christian Subano, to sign a deed of sale disguised as a lease. The court ruled that the deed was invalid for not being approved by the Provincial Governor, as required for conveyances by non-Christian tribes. The decision ordered petitioners to vacate the land, restore possession to Amban, and pay damages, attorney's fees, and costs. Petitioners received the decision on December 10, 1962. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on November 27, 1962, seeking to set aside the October 18 order, citing counsel's medical condition and a pending relocation survey. This motion was denied on February 15, 1963. Amban moved for execution on January 24, 1963, which was denied on February 23, 1963. Amban moved for reconsideration of the denial on March 13, 1963. Petitioners' counsel, on March 19, 1963, wired a request for postponement of the hearing set for March 20, citing urgent business in Manila. On March 22, 1963, the trial court reconsidered its denial and granted Amban's motion for execution. Copies of the orders denying reconsideration and granting execution were mailed on March 15, 1963, and received by petitioners' counsel on April 3, 1963. On April 22, 1963, petitioners filed a petition for relief from judgment in the lower court, seeking to set aside the orders and the decision. This petition was denied on May 13, 1963. The Petition: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, assailing the respondent judge's alleged grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders and rendering the decision. They argued that the case was not ready for trial on October 18, 1962, due to a pending relocation survey. They also contended that the court should have granted their counsel's request for postponement, given his medical condition and the court's previous leniency in another case. Furthermore, they argued that their petition for relief was timely filed and should have been granted.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with the hearing on October 18, 1962, despite the absence of petitioners' counsel. Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration and subsequently granting the writ of execution. Whether the petitioners' petition for relief from judgment was timely filed and meritorious.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari. It found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. The Court held that the judgment had become final and executory, and the petition for relief was filed out of time and lacked the required verification and affidavit of merit.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the judge's order to proceed with the hearing on October 18, 1962. While petitioners' counsel cited medical reasons, the Court noted that the case had been postponed multiple times at the instance of the petitioners. The counsel had received notice of the hearing on September 25, 1962, but did not arrange for a postponement until after he left for Cebu and underwent surgery on October 10, just eight days before the scheduled trial. The Court emphasized the policy of expediting case disposal and stated that the counsel's negligence in failing to act promptly and notify the adverse party or seek agreement for postponement was the cause of the predicament. The Court also pointed out that the alleged importance of a relocation survey was not pursued by the petitioners through proper motions. On Issue 2: The Court found no abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion for reconsideration and the subsequent granting of the writ of execution. The judgment of November 23, 1962, had become final and executory by December 10, 1962, when petitioners' counsel received a copy. The 30-day period for appeal had elapsed. The Court stated that once a judgment becomes final, the trial court is mandated to issue a writ of execution upon petition by the prevailing party. The pendency of the petitioners' motion to reconsider the order of October 18, 1962, did not suspend the finality of the judgment. The order granting execution on March 22, 1963, effectively acted as a denial of the earlier motion for reconsideration, which was interlocutory. On Issue 3: The Court ruled that the petition for relief filed on April 22, 1963, was filed out of time. Petitioners' counsel admitted receiving the decision on December 10, 1962. The 60-day period under Rule 38 for filing a petition for relief had long elapsed. The Court reiterated that this period is strictly fixed, inextendible, and cannot be interrupted. Furthermore, even if it were timely, the petition for relief was fatally defective because it was not verified and did not attach an affidavit of merit, violating Section 3 of Rule 38 and established jurisprudence. The Court also addressed the merits of the petitioners' claim of ownership, finding that the alleged deed of sale was a private document, not acknowledged, and lacked the required approval of the Provincial Governor, thus it could not be legally sustained.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court affirmed that a petition for relief from judgment must be filed within the strict 60-day period from the petitioner's receipt of notice of the judgment or order, and this period is non-extendible. Moreover, such a petition must be duly verified and accompanied by an affidavit of merit, failing which it may be dismissed. The Court also emphasized that a trial court's decision to proceed with a hearing or deny a postponement, when a party's counsel exhibits negligence or fails to act with due diligence, does not constitute grave abuse of discretion if the court is merely enforcing the policy of expediting the disposition of cases.