Romero v. Gomera
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Gregorio Y. Romero, appointed Chief of Police of Boljoon, Cebu, in 1954, faced multiple administrative charges. The first, filed August 16, 1962, concerned serious irregularities in official duties, leading to his suspension. Subsequently, a complaint for willful neglect to pay a just obligation to Villarica Finance Company was filed, and another charge for gross misconduct and dishonesty arose from his alleged refusal to record a complaint and take action. 2. Procedural History: Following his suspension on August 16, 1962, for irregularities, the Municipal Council of Boljoon dismissed Romero on November 16, 1962, via Resolution No. 66, which he appealed to the Civil Service Commission. Separately, the Municipal Council dismissed Romero on December 17, 1962, through Resolution No. 75, for failing to pay a debt, a decision Romero also contested. A fourth administrative complaint for gross misconduct and dishonesty was filed, but the Council postponed its hearing indefinitely. Romero sought reinstatement and nullification of the dismissal resolutions through a petition for mandamus and/or certiorari and prohibition filed with the Court of First Instance. 3. The Petition: Romero filed a petition for a writ of mandamus and/or certiorari and prohibition with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, seeking immediate reinstatement as Chief of Police, nullification of Resolution No. 75 dismissing him for non-payment of debt, prohibition of further proceedings in the fourth administrative case, and recovery of back salaries and damages. The respondents argued that the petition failed to state a cause of action, that any delay in the decision was due to Romero's own actions, and that he had not exhausted administrative remedies. The Court of First Instance granted the writ of mandamus for reinstatement, declared Resolution No. 75 void, and dismissed the petition for prohibition, leading to the present appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether appellee Gregorio Y. Romero is entitled to reinstatement pending the final determination of his appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service. Whether the Municipal Council of Boljoon had jurisdiction to try Administrative Case No. 3 for failure to pay a just debt. Whether the Municipal Council of Boljoon had jurisdiction to proceed with Administrative Case No. 4 for alleged gross misconduct and dishonesty.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court, insofar as it directed the immediate reinstatement of the appellee. The Court held that the appellee was not entitled to immediate reinstatement pending the final determination of his appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
On the entitlement to reinstatement pending appeal: The Court reiterated the principle that under Republic Act No. 557, a suspended police official is entitled to reinstatement if the administrative case against him is not finally decided within sixty (60) days from his preventive suspension. However, this entitlement is negated if the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence, or petition of the respondent. In this case, the appellee's appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service constituted a voluntary act that excused any delay in the final disposition of the charges against him. Therefore, he did not possess a clear legal right to immediate reinstatement that could be enforced by mandamus. The Court emphasized that mandamus should not be exercised in a manner injurious to public interest or where it would not promote substantial justice. The ruling in Alacar vs. City Mayor etc. and Martinez vs. Municipal Mayor of Labason, et al. were applied, which established that an appeal by the suspended official excuses delay and negates the right to reinstatement. On the jurisdiction of the Municipal Council in Administrative Case No. 3: While the lower court declared the proceedings and resolution void, the Supreme Court's reversal of the reinstatement order implicitly suggests that the issue of jurisdiction in Administrative Case No. 3, concerning the payment of a 'just debt,' was not the primary basis for the reversal. The Court's focus was on the entitlement to reinstatement under Republic Act No. 557 and the effect of the appeal. The case of Kordovez vs. Carmona, etc. was cited, which clarified that Republic Act No. 557, a special law, was not repealed by the general Civil Service Act of 1959 (Republic Act No. 2260), and that the grounds for dismissal under the special law should be followed. The Police Act of 1966 also reproduced the provision regarding delay caused by the respondent. On the jurisdiction of the Municipal Council in Administrative Case No. 4: Similar to Administrative Case No. 3, the Supreme Court's decision did not explicitly rule on the jurisdiction of the Municipal Council in Administrative Case No. 4 concerning alleged gross misconduct and dishonesty. The Court's primary concern was the appellee's right to reinstatement pending appeal. The rationale applied to Administrative Case No. 2, regarding the effect of the appeal on the sixty-day period, would likely extend to the procedural aspects of other pending administrative cases. The principle that the special law (Republic Act No. 557) prevails over a general law (Republic Act No. 2260) in case of conflict was a guiding factor in the Court's interpretation of the applicable rules for police officials.
Main Doctrine
A suspended police official is entitled to reinstatement if the administrative case against him has not been finally decided within sixty (60) days after his preventive suspension, unless the delay in the disposition of the case is due to his own fault or petition, such as an appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service.