Cobb-Perez v. Lantin
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute originated from a civil case filed by Ricardo P. Hermoso against Damaso P. Perez and Gregorio Subong for the recovery of P17,309.44 representing unpaid purchases of leather materials for their shoe manufacturing business. A default judgment was rendered against Perez and Subong, ordering them to pay the debt jointly and severally. 2. Procedural History: After their appeal to the Court of Appeals was dismissed and their petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied, Hermoso sought execution of the judgment. Perez and Subong's petition for relief from judgment was denied, and their subsequent appeal was also dismissed. Multiple attempts were made to execute the judgment, involving the levy and attempted sale of Damaso Perez's shares in Republic Bank. These attempts were repeatedly suspended or enjoined through various motions, appeals, and separate civil actions filed by both Damaso Perez and his wife, Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez, who claimed the shares were conjugal property and not answerable for her husband's personal debt. These actions, including motions to quash the writ of execution and separate injunction suits, were consistently denied by the lower courts. 3. The Petition: The petitioners, Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez and Damaso P. Perez, filed a petition for certiorari with an urgent writ of preliminary injunction, seeking to quash the order denying their motion for reconsideration of the denial of their motion to quash the writ of execution. They argued that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to recall the writ of execution because the levied shares were conjugal property and the judgment debt was a personal obligation of Damaso Perez. They invoked Article 160 of the New Civil Code, presuming the shares to be conjugal unless proven otherwise, and contended that the debt was not contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to recall the writ of execution. Whether the levied shares of stock are conjugal assets and thus not answerable for the personal obligation of Damaso Perez. Whether Damaso Perez is estopped from asserting the conjugal nature of the levied shares.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed, and the writ of preliminary injunction is dissolved. Treble costs are assessed against the petitioners, to be paid by their counsel.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of the motion to quash: The Supreme Court held that while courts have the inherent power to correct errors of their ministerial officers and control their processes, this power is circumscribed. A motion to quash a writ of execution is proper only in specific situations, such as when the writ is improvidently issued, defective, issued against the wrong party, the judgment is paid, or there has been a change in the parties' situation making execution inequitable. In this case, the petitioners did not question the intrinsic validity or regularity of the writ itself. Instead, they attacked the levy made by the Sheriff. The Court clarified that the proper remedy to question the conjugal nature of levied stocks is not a motion to recall the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with the sale, wherein the conjugal nature must be established. The petitioners had availed themselves of this remedy in previous cases but abandoned it. On the issue of estoppel: The Court found that Damaso Perez was estopped from asserting that the levied shares are conjugal assets. In a previous proceeding (CA-G.R. 29962-R), he had practically asserted exclusive ownership of the shares, challenging only the legality and propriety of the levy with respect to its excessive coverage. He never raised the question of the conjugal nature of the shares. Having represented himself as the exclusive owner, he is now precluded from asserting the opposite, as this assertion should have been made with alacrity when he first questioned the levy. This principle also binds his wife, Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez, who stands in privity with him and cannot feign ignorance of his affairs given the delay in questioning the levy. On the conjugal nature of the shares and the nature of the debt: Even granting that the court could take cognizance of the motion to quash, the petitioners failed to substantiate their claim. They invoked Article 160 of the Civil Code, which presumes property acquired during marriage to be conjugal. However, the Court reiterated that proof of acquisition during the marriage is a sine qua non for this presumption to operate. Since there was no evidence as to when the shares were acquired, the fact that they were registered in the husband's name alone was indicative of his exclusive ownership. Furthermore, even if the shares were conjugal, the petitioners failed to prove that the partnership was not liable for the debt. The contention that the debt was personal to Damaso Perez was devoid of evidentiary foundation. The obligation was contracted for the purchase of leather for his shoe manufacturing business, an ordinary commercial enterprise for gain. Debts contracted by the husband in the exercise of his industry or profession to support the family are not considered his exclusive debts. The Court noted the petitioners' resort to a series of actions to thwart the execution of a final and executory judgment.
Main Doctrine
A motion to quash a writ of execution is not the proper remedy to question the conjugal nature of levied properties; the proper remedy is an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff. Furthermore, a party may be estopped from asserting the conjugal nature of property if they previously represented it as their exclusive property.