Rizal Surety & Insurance v. Macondray

G.R. No. L-24064 · 1968-02-29 · J. CONCEPCION, C.J, J.: · Primary: Commercial; Secondary: Civil
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Plaintiff, Rizal Surety & Insurance Company, sought to recover P2,000.00 from defendant Macondray & Co., Inc., the agent for Barber Steamship Line Inc. This sum represented the maximum value of machinery parts shipped on the vessel "SS Tai Ping" from New York to Manila, which were not discharged by the vessel upon arrival. Rizal Surety had paid this amount to the consignee, Edwardson Manufacturing Corporation, under an insurance contract. Procedural History: The plaintiff filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The defendant raised the defense of prescription, which the lower court sustained, leading to the dismissal of the complaint. The plaintiff appealed this decision directly to the Supreme Court. The Petition: The plaintiff-appellant argues that the one-year prescriptive period under Section 3, Title I of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act does not apply when the goods are not discharged from the carrying vessel. Instead, they contend that the general statute of limitations should govern. The defendant-appellee asserts that the one-year period, calculated from the date the goods should have been delivered (November 4, 1962), had expired before the action was commenced on February 10, 1964. The bill of lading incorporated the Carriage by Sea Act, making its provisions applicable.

Issue(s)

Whether the one-year prescriptive period under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act applies to a shipment that was not discharged from the vessel. Whether the general statute of limitations should apply in such a case.

Ruling

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, holding that the one-year prescriptive period under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act is controlling and applies even if the goods were not discharged from the vessel. The Court ruled that the period commenced from the date the goods should have been delivered and had expired before the action was filed.

Ratio Decidendi

On Issue 1: The Court held that the one-year prescriptive period under Section 3, Title I, of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act applies to the case at bar. This provision contemplates not only damage but also loss of goods, and it explicitly covers situations where delivery has not been made. The law states that suit must be brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered. The Court emphasized that the provision anticipates two scenarios: either delivery has been made, or no delivery has taken place. In the latter case, the period is computed from the date the goods should have been delivered, and the reason for such non-delivery, including whether the goods were discharged from the vessel or not, is immaterial. If the goods were not discharged, it is still imputable to the carrier. On Issue 2: The Court found no merit in the plaintiff's contention that the general statute of limitations should apply. It reasoned that the bill of lading expressly stipulated that it was "subject to the Provisions of the Carriage by Sea Act of the U.S. of America, approved April 16, 1936, which shall be deemed to be incorporated" therein. Therefore, the COGSA, as incorporated into the contract of carriage, governs the prescriptive period, superseding any general statute of limitations. The Court further noted that the vessel arrived on November 2, 1962, and left on November 4, 1962, making November 4, 1962, the last opportunity for delivery. Consequently, the one-year period commenced on November 5, 1962, and expired on November 4, 1963. The action was filed on February 10, 1964, which was beyond the prescriptive period.

Main Doctrine

The one-year prescriptive period stipulated in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act for bringing suit for loss or damage to goods is controlling and applies even when the goods were not discharged from the carrying vessel. The period is computed from the date the goods should have been delivered, as the cause of non-delivery, whether discharge or otherwise, is immaterial if it is imputable to the carrier.

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