Ranillo v. Queto
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: A judgment was rendered on April 29, 1957, in Civil Case No. 1828, ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs jointly and severally P3,000.00 in actual and moral damages, plus P1,000.00 for attorney's fees, to be made effective on a P40,000.00 bond posted to avoid compliance with a preliminary injunction, along with costs. 2. Procedural History: The defendants appealed the judgment, but their appeal was dismissed on July 9, 1958, for failure to submit an amended record on appeal. A motion for reconsideration was denied on August 29, 1958, and a subsequent petition for mandamus to compel the lower court to give due course to the appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court on October 16, 1958. An initial writ of execution was issued on November 19, 1958, and an alias writ on January 22, 1959, both returned unsatisfied. A motion on June 9, 1959, to claim satisfaction from the defendants' bond led to a Supreme Court grant of certiorari and prohibition on June 29, 1962, annulling the order holding the counterbond liable due to lack of notice to the sureties. Subsequently, plaintiffs learned of properties owned by Matias Ranillo, Jr. (herein petitioner) in Quezon City and moved for another alias writ of execution on the April 29, 1957 judgment, which the lower court granted on July 27, 1964. Ranillo then filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary mandatory injunction in the Court of Appeals, which, after initially issuing an injunction, ultimately dismissed the petition, ruling it had no jurisdiction as the issue was one of law. 3. The Petition: This petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction, seeks to annul the July 27, 1964 order of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental granting an alias writ of execution. The petitioner argues that the lower court acted without jurisdiction by issuing the writ more than five years after the judgment's entry or finality, contrary to Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner contends the five-year period should be counted from the judgment's entry or finality, or at the latest, from the dismissal of the appeal on July 9, 1958. The respondents argue the period should begin from the Supreme Court's dismissal of the mandamus petition on October 16, 1958. The petition also seeks review of the Court of Appeals' dismissal of Ranillo's prior petition.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Court of First Instance acted without jurisdiction in granting an alias writ of execution on July 27, 1964, more than five (5) years after the entry of the judgment. Whether the five-year period for execution by motion should be counted from the date of the judgment's entry, its finality, or the dismissal of the petition for mandamus.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulled the order dated July 27, 1964, of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, and declared that the alias writ of execution was issued without jurisdiction. Costs were against the private respondents.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the respondent Court of First Instance acted without jurisdiction in issuing the alias writ of execution on July 27, 1964. This was because the motion for execution was filed more than five (5) years after the entry of the judgment. Section 6 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that a judgment may be executed on motion within five years from its entry or finality. After this period, the judgment can only be enforced by an independent action to revive it. The Court found that regardless of whether the five-year period was counted from the entry of the judgment (April 29, 1957) or the dismissal of the appeal (July 9, 1958), or even the dismissal of the mandamus petition (October 16, 1958), more than five years had elapsed by July 27, 1964. Therefore, the remedy available to the plaintiffs was to file a new action to revive the judgment, not to seek execution by motion. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court clarified that the five-year period for execution by motion under Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court should be counted from the date of the judgment's entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. The Court found it unnecessary to definitively pinpoint the exact starting date of the five-year period from the initial judgment, as it was evident that more than five years had passed from any plausible starting point, including the judgment's entry on April 29, 1957, the dismissal of the appeal on July 9, 1958, and the dismissal of the petition for mandamus on October 16, 1958, up to the date the alias writ was issued on July 27, 1964. The Court emphasized that after the lapse of the five-year period, the judgment is reduced to a mere right of action, which must be enforced by instituting a complaint in the regular form to revive the judgment.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court reiterated that a judgment can be executed by motion within five years from its entry or finality. Beyond this period, the judgment is reduced to a mere right of action and can only be enforced through an independent action to revive the judgment, emphasizing the procedural requirement for timely enforcement.