Equizabal v. Maleniza
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Nazario Equizabal, the Municipal Mayor of Buhi, Camarines Sur, was suspended by the Provincial Governor on January 22, 1965, due to administrative charges (Adm. Case No. 3) for oppression, maladministration, violation of the Administrative Code, serious misconduct, and neglect of duty. Petitioner received the order on February 5, 1965, marking the start of his 30-day suspension period. Procedural History: Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss Adm. Case No. 3 on February 16, 1965, which was denied by the Provincial Board on March 2, 1965. Hearings for Adm. Case No. 3 were scheduled and postponed multiple times. On March 10, 1965, new charges (Adm. Case No. 4) were filed against petitioner, leading to a second suspension order on March 12, 1965. In Adm. Case No. 4, two complainants moved to withdraw their complaint, alleging fraud. The Provincial Board set this motion for hearing. Petitioner's counsel requested continuances in both cases. On April 13, 1965, petitioner filed the instant petition for mandamus and prohibition. The Petition: Petitioner sought to compel his reinstatement effective March 12, 1965, to enjoin the hearing of Adm. Case No. 4, and to recover damages. He argued that his 30-day suspension period had expired on March 11, 1965, and he should have been reinstated on March 12, 1965.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioner should have been reinstated on March 12, 1965, considering the expiration of the 30-day preventive suspension period. Whether the institution of a second administrative case (Adm. Case No. 4) and the subsequent suspension order affected the petitioner's right to reinstatement.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The petitioner is not entitled to reinstatement on March 12, 1965.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of reinstatement and the expiration of the 30-day preventive suspension period: The Court held that the petitioner's argument for reinstatement on March 12, 1965, was flawed. While the initial 30-day suspension period began on February 5, 1965, the Court found that delays in the proceedings were imputable to the petitioner. Specifically, the petitioner's motion to dismiss Adm. Case No. 3, filed on February 16, 1965, and resolved on March 2, 1965, prevented the Provincial Board from proceeding with the hearing on the merits for 14 days. Section 2189 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that the period of preventive suspension runs only when the respondent municipal official does nothing to hinder the provincial board from immediately proceeding to dispose of the administrative case on its merits. The time during which the board was prevented from acting due to the petitioner's motion should not be counted in computing the 30-day suspension period. Therefore, the 30-day period had not yet expired by March 11, 1965, as claimed by the petitioner. On the effect of the second administrative case and suspension order: Even if the petitioner's calculation of the 30-day suspension were correct, his claim for reinstatement on March 12, 1965, would still be without merit due to the institution of Administrative Case No. 4 against him, which resulted in a new suspension order. The Court also addressed the petitioner's claim of malice regarding the complainant in Adm. Case No. 4, stating that the Governor was the complainant before the Provincial Board, with Atutubo, Esquivel, and Arce acting as supporting witnesses before the Governor. The Court clarified that under Sections 2188 and 2189 of the Revised Administrative Code, only a copy of the written charges needs to be served on the respondent, not supporting affidavits. Furthermore, any delay in setting Adm. Case No. 4 for hearing was also partly due to the petitioner's own motion to dismiss filed on March 18, 1965, which would again divert the board's attention from the merits of the case.
Main Doctrine
The period of preventive suspension of a municipal officer under Section 2189 of the Revised Administrative Code runs only when the respondent municipal official does nothing to hinder the provincial board from immediately proceeding to dispose of the administrative case on its merits. Any delay caused by the respondent's actions, such as filing a motion to dismiss, is not counted in computing the 30-day period of suspension.