Guzman v. Cloribel
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners, Lucrecio de Guzman and Adela de la Cruz, are the parents of Eduardo de Guzman, a 15-year-old newspaper vendor who died on February 2, 1961, after being run over by a passenger bus owned by respondent Vilfran Transportation Co. (Company) and driven by respondent Artemio Aguilar y Mallari. Eduardo had boarded the bus to sell newspapers while it was in motion and fell or jumped from it, sustaining fatal injuries. Procedural History: Petitioners filed a civil case for damages against the respondents, and a criminal action for homicide through reckless negligence was also filed against Aguilar. Respondents moved to dismiss the civil complaint on April 28, 1964, but petitioners countered with a motion to declare respondents in default, alleging the motion to dismiss was filed one day late. On May 16, 1964, the trial court declared respondents in default, allowed the reception of petitioners' evidence, and denied their motion for reconsideration on June 1, 1964. Subsequently, on August 11, 1964, the court rendered judgment ordering respondents to pay P70,000.00 in damages, plus P8.00 daily, P589.00 for medical and funeral expenses, P10,000.00 for attorney's fees, and costs. The Petition: On August 28, 1964, respondents filed a petition for relief from judgment to set aside the default order and judgment, admit their answer, and present evidence. Petitioners moved for execution on September 17, 1964, asserting the decision was final. Respondents filed a supplemental petition and opposition to execution on October 3, 1964. On October 6, 1964, the trial court denied the motion for execution, granted the petition for relief, set aside the decision, admitted the answer, and allowed the Company to present evidence, which denial of petitioners' motion for reconsideration on November 4, 1964, led to the present action for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition by petitioners, alleging grave abuse of discretion and neglect of duty by the respondent judge.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in granting the respondents' petition for relief from judgment. Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioners to serve a copy of their motion for reconsideration upon respondents who had been declared in default. Whether the respondent judge neglected the performance of a ministerial duty in refusing to issue a writ of execution despite the circumstance that the decision of August 11, 1964, was immediately executory.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed, and the writs prayed for are denied. The orders of October 6 and November 4, 1964, are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion in granting the petition for relief from judgment: The Court found that the petitioners' contention was predicated on a false premise. The respondents' petitions, though entitled "petitions for relief from judgment," were in fact motions for new trial, which suspended the running of the period to appeal. These petitions were filed before the decision of August 11, 1964, had become final and executory. The Court noted that the respondents alleged excusable negligence regarding the notice of the order denying their motion for reconsideration of the default order. Furthermore, the respondents' answer was filed within the reglementary period for filing a motion for new trial or an appeal, and their petitions sought to set aside the default order and the judgment, and to be allowed to present evidence. The Court emphasized that considering the motion to dismiss was late by only one day, and the petition for relief was filed before the judgment became final, the ends of justice and fair play were promoted by the judge's actions. On the issue of requiring petitioners to serve a copy of their motion for reconsideration: The Court found no merit in this contention. The respondents' petitions for relief from judgment, which were treated as motions for new trial, were properly filed and suspended the period for appeal. It was not necessary for the petitioners to be required to answer these petitions before the judge could act on them. The Court also noted that the petitioners had an opportunity to elucidate on all matters relevant to the petition for relief in their motion for reconsideration, and that the respondents' petition for relief indicated that a copy had been furnished to the petitioners' counsel by registered mail. On the issue of neglecting a ministerial duty in refusing to issue a writ of execution: The Court clarified that a judgment rendered in default is not immediately executory, as it is appealable. A motion to set aside the order of default, upon the ground of fraud, accident, error, or excusable neglect, was necessary prior to 1964. The respondents' petition for relief from judgment, dated August 28, 1964, served this purpose. Moreover, since January 1, 1964, when the new Rules of Court became effective, even said motion to set aside the order of default has been dispensed with by explicit provision of the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 41, of the Rules of Court. The Court also considered the decision in the criminal case, which held that the death of Eduardo de Guzman was due to an accident not imputable to the negligence of the accused, as a defense against the civil action. The substantial amount of damages awarded also weighed in favor of allowing the respondents to present their defense.
Main Doctrine
A petition for relief from judgment, filed before the judgment becomes final and executory, suspends the running of the period to appeal and is considered a motion for new trial, even if mislabeled. A motion to dismiss filed one day late, when accompanied by a petition for relief from judgment, warrants the setting aside of a default order to promote justice and fair play.