People v. Macalisang
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On November 14, 1949, two bloody incidents occurred in Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental. In the first, Mayor Sofronio Avanceña was shot and mortally wounded, along with his companions, by Victoriano Simbajon and his group. The accused-appellant, Isaias Macalisang, who was the Chief of Police and a supporter of Mayor Avanceña, was among those wounded in this first incident. Minutes later, while being transported to Ozamis City in a jeep driven by Fr. William Bourke, Macalisang, who was in the front seat, pointed his gun at Francisco Dano, who was standing by the roadside, and fired. Dano was hit in the back and died later that day. Dano's wife testified that her husband identified Macalisang as his assailant, which testimony was considered a dying declaration. Procedural History: The accused-appellant, Isaias Macalisang, was charged with murder for the death of Francisco Dano. The trial court found him guilty of murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, and to pay costs. The Petition: The accused-appellant appealed the decision of the trial court.
Issue(s)
Whether the accused-appellant was unconscious or under shock at the time of the shooting, negating criminal liability. Whether the killing of Francisco Dano was qualified by treachery, thus constituting murder.
Ruling
The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the trial court. It ruled that the killing of Francisco Dano was homicide, not murder, as treachery was not proven. The Court sentenced the appellant to an indeterminate penalty for homicide, with the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, and affirmed the civil indemnity.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of unconsciousness: The Court found that the appellant's claim of unconsciousness was not convincing. While the appellant sustained serious gunshot wounds in the earlier incident, his attending physician testified that it was possible for him to have regained consciousness after 10 minutes and to have full control of his upper extremities. The evidence showed that between the time appellant was hit and when Fr. Bourke arrived, approximately 10 to 15 minutes had passed. Furthermore, the appellant admitted to Captain Rafols, "I was the one who shot Mr. Dano." The Court gave more weight to the positive assertions of witnesses like Fr. Bourke, Lopez, and Capt. Rafols over the appellant's self-serving version and the doctor's indecisive testimony. A criminal act is presumed voluntary, and speculation or guesswork cannot overturn this presumption. Therefore, the shooting was declared voluntary and punishable. On the issue of treachery: The Court held that treachery was not present. While the bullet wound was at the victim's back, this fact alone does not prove treachery. The Court emphasized that treachery requires the method of assault to be deliberately chosen with a view to accomplishing the act without risk to the assailant. In this case, the appellant, who was wounded and being transported, encountered Dano by chance on the road. The attack was described as an impulse of the moment, with the appellant in a moving jeep and the victim standing still. There was no evidence that the appellant deliberately chose this method to ensure the commission of the crime without risk. Therefore, the killing was not qualified by treachery, and the crime committed was homicide, not murder.
Main Doctrine
The mere location of a bullet wound at the back, by itself, does not prove treachery. Treachery requires that the method of assault be deliberately chosen to accomplish the act without risk to the assailant from any defense the victim may make. If the attack was an impulse of the moment and the victim's position was accidental, treachery does not attach.