Maribao v. Estenzo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The City of Ormoc instituted an expropriation case (Sp. Civil Case No. 711-0) to acquire several tracts of land for a "City Government Center." Petitioners, Gil V. Maribao and Enriqueta Llanillo-Maribao, were among the 31 defendants as owners of some of the lots. Procedural History: The City prayed for an order fixing the provisional value of the properties at P50,000.00 and for immediate possession upon deposit. The respondent Judge Estenzo issued an order on February 3, 1965, fixing the provisional value and, upon certification of fund availability, ordered the issuance of a writ of possession. Other defendants filed motions to dismiss, which were denied on February 23, 1965, wherein the court declared the City's right to expropriate and appointed commissioners. The Maribaos, who were served summons only on February 23, 1965, filed motions to set aside the orders of February 3 and 23, 1965, and a motion to dismiss, arguing lack of jurisdiction due to service of summons after the orders were issued. These motions were denied on March 13, 1965. Subsequent motions for reconsideration and for new trial were also denied. Commissioners submitted a report recommending P0.29 to P0.30 per square meter, and the Judge rendered a decision on June 30, 1965, fixing the value at P0.30 per square meter. The Maribaos filed an opposition to the report and a motion for reconsideration of the decision, which were denied. The Petition: Petitioners filed an original action for certiorari with the Supreme Court, seeking to annul the orders of Judge Estenzo and to enjoin him from proceeding further. They contended that the Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in: (1) giving due course to the complaint without presidential or departmental approval for eminent domain; (2) issuing the writ of possession and appointing commissioners before acquiring jurisdiction over their persons by summons and before their motion to dismiss was denied; (3) not requiring deposit of "money" before issuing the writ of possession; (4) denying their motions to set aside and reconsider orders; and (5) appointing biased and incompetent city officers as commissioners who allegedly denied them a chance to present evidence.
Issue(s)
Whether the alleged absence of presidential or departmental approval for the City's exercise of eminent domain divested the trial court of jurisdiction. Whether the issuance of a writ of possession and the appointment of commissioners prior to the service of summons constitutes a grave abuse of discretion reviewable by certiorari.
Ruling
The petition is clearly devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the alleged irregularities complained of by the petitioners did not divest the lower court of its jurisdiction nor did they constitute a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. These were mere incidents in the exercise of jurisdiction, reviewable by appeal, not by certiorari. The Court ordered the dismissal of the petition with costs against the petitioners.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the alleged absence of presidential or departmental approval did not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law, and the court admittedly had jurisdiction over the properties (located in Leyte) and eventually over the persons of the petitioners through the service of summons. The presence or absence of administrative approval, assuming it was necessary, affects only the City's cause of action—the legal right to bring the suit—rather than the court's fundamental power to hear and decide the case. Thus, any error by the trial court in this regard would be an error of judgment, not an error of jurisdiction. On Issue 2: The Court ruled that the alleged procedural irregularities were mere incidents in the exercise of jurisdiction and did not constitute a grave abuse of discretion that would justify certiorari. Although the writ of possession was issued before the Maribaos were summoned, they were subsequently served and had ample opportunity to be heard through various motions and a motion for new trial. Because the petitioners had the remedy of an ordinary appeal available to them—a remedy which their co-defendants actually utilized—the special civil action for certiorari could not be maintained. Under the Rules of Court, certiorari is only available when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. Consequently, the Maribaos' choice of the wrong procedural vehicle was fatal to their petition.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court affirmed that a writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is not a remedy for any and all alleged errors committed by a lower court. It is an extraordinary remedy available only when a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Procedural errors or irregularities in the exercise of jurisdiction, such as the timing of summons or the appointment of commissioners in an expropriation case, do not divest the court of its jurisdiction and are matters that should be raised on appeal after final judgment.