Jimenea v. Guanzon
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Pedro Jimenea passed the Civil Service Patrolman Examination on February 27, 1960. On November 20, 1963, then Mayor Teofisto Cordova appointed Jimenea as Second Class Patrolman, characterizing the appointment as "provisional." Jimenea took his oath and commenced service on November 25, 1963. Subsequently, Mayor Romeo G. Guanzon, who won the local elections, initiated an administrative case against Jimenea, in which Jimenea was acquitted. On May 13, 1964, Mayor Guanzon requested the Civil Service Commissioner to disapprove Jimenea's appointment, citing non-conformity with a memorandum circular and the availability of higher-rated eligibles. On the same date, Acting Civil Service Commissioner Abelardo Subido, in an "First Indorsement," approved the appointment as "temporary" only for the period of actual service but not beyond the receipt of the communication. Pursuant to this, Mayor Guanzon terminated Jimenea's services on May 20, 1964, and appointed Luis Gador in his stead. Procedural History: On July 15, 1964, Jimenea filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction, seeking restoration to his position and enjoining Gador from continuing therein. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss filed by Guanzon and Gador. After the parties submitted a stipulation of facts and memoranda, the lower court rendered a decision on April 14, 1965, dismissing Jimenea's petition. The Petition: Jimenea appealed to the Supreme Court, raising issues regarding the nature of his appointment (temporary or permanent) and whether it conferred a vested right to permanent occupancy.
Issue(s)
Was the appointment extended to petitioner-appellant temporary or permanent? Did said appointment confer upon petitioner-appellant a vested right to occupy in a permanent character the position to which he was appointed?
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, dismissing the petition. The Court held that Jimenea's appointment was temporary and did not confer a vested right to permanent occupancy. Costs against petitioner-appellant.
Ratio Decidendi
On the nature of the appointment (temporary or permanent): The Court examined the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Rep. Act No. 2260), particularly the provision on provisional appointments. It noted that a provisional appointment is generally for a person who has not qualified in an appropriate examination, which did not apply to Jimenea, a civil service eligible. However, the Court considered the circumstances surrounding the appointment by the outgoing Mayor Cordova, who knew that the incoming Mayor Guanzon should have the privilege of filling vacant positions. The "provisional" designation was interpreted as an intent to allow the incoming mayor to retain or replace Jimenea, thus indicating a temporary nature. The Court emphasized that the character of the appointment, not the nature of the position filled, determines its permanence. Therefore, Jimenea's appointment was deemed temporary. On whether the appointment conferred a vested right to permanent occupancy: The Court held that a temporary appointment does not confer a vested right to permanent occupancy or security of tenure. Civil service eligibles accepting temporary positions are not entitled to the protections afforded by Republic Act No. 557 or the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. Their employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power without the need to show cause. Furthermore, even assuming the appointment was permanent, it had not yet become final as it was subject to review by the Civil Service Commissioner within 180 days. The Commissioner acted within his powers when he corrected the appointment's nature to "temporary" within this period, thus terminating Jimenea's appointment. Consequently, Jimenea could not claim any vested right.
Main Doctrine
A provisional appointment, even if issued to a civil service eligible for a permanent position, does not confer a vested right to permanent occupancy and can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power, especially when the Civil Service Commissioner acts within the prescribed period to correct or revise the appointment.