Quetulio v. De la Cuesta
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiffs-appellants, heirs of the Quetulio family, filed a complaint for recovery of real property against defendants-appellees, alleging they are heirs in possession since 1906 of a parcel of land. They claimed that in May 1948, Nena de la Cuesta, owner of adjacent property, caused her men to usurp a portion of their land, leading them to file Civil Case No. 705, which was dismissed without prejudice on June 25, 1955. They further alleged that on September 2, 3, and 4, 1963, acts of usurpation were again committed, causing them damages. Procedural History: Defendants alleged that the land in question was part of the land formerly owned by Anselma Crisologo, and after partition, Tomas de la Cuesta obtained the land in question. Nena de la Cuesta, as his wife and usufructuary, and their children took possession. Defendants moved for dismissal on the ground of prescription, asserting that Civil Case No. 705 did not interrupt the prescriptive period. Plaintiffs opposed, arguing that the dismissal without prejudice interrupted prescription and invoked the imprescriptibility of actions to quiet title. The Court of First Instance dismissed the case on the ground of prescription, citing Amar v. Odiamon. The court denied admission of plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court from the denial order and the dismissal of the complaint. The Petition: Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their complaint and the denial of their motion to amend the complaint.
Issue(s)
Whether the filing of Civil Case No. 705, dismissed without prejudice, interrupted the prescriptive period for the recovery of real property. Whether the denial of the motion to amend the complaint was proper.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order of the lower court denying admission of the proposed amended complaint and dismissing the original complaint.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of interruption of prescription: The Court held that under Section 40 of Act 190, the Code of Civil Procedure, the filing of an action within the prescriptive period, if the plaintiff desists in its prosecution or if it is dismissed, does not suspend the running of the statute of limitations and takes no time out of the period of prescription. This is because Act 190 does not have any specific or express provision on the suspension or interruption of the prescriptive period by the institution of an action that is subsequently dismissed. The Court reiterated the settled interpretation of this provision, which was rightly applied by the lower court. On the issue of denial of the motion to amend: The Court stated that the denial of permission to amend a complaint that was dismissed because on its face the cause has prescribed is not justified where the allegation of fact upon which prescription was based is sought to be rectified by the amendment. However, in the present case, the proposed amendment sought no rectification of any fact that would do away with the application of prescription. On the contrary, the amendment would establish the cause of action to have arisen even earlier, in 1946, instead of 1948. Thus, even if the amendment were admitted, the cause would still have prescribed by 1964, when the present suit was brought. Therefore, the denial of the amendment was affirmed in light of the prescriptive period.
Main Doctrine
The filing of an action within the prescriptive period, if dismissed or the plaintiff desists in its prosecution, does not suspend the running of the statute of limitations under Act 190, as this Act does not have any specific provision on the suspension or interruption of the prescriptive period by the institution of an action that is subsequently dismissed. Furthermore, the denial of permission to amend a complaint that was dismissed on the ground of prescription is not justified where the amendment seeks to rectify facts that would do away with prescription; however, if the amendment would establish the cause of action to have arisen even earlier, the cause would still have prescribed.