People v. Yap
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The accused, Agapito Yap, Jr., was convicted by the Municipal Court of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, of simple seduction upon the complaint of Catalina Babol. The information filed in the Court of First Instance alleged that the accused, by means of deceit and false promise of marriage, had sexual intercourse several times with Catalina Babol, a virgin over 12 but under 18 years of age, resulting in pregnancy with subsequent abortion. Procedural History: The accused moved to quash the information, claiming it alleged multiple acts of simple seduction and criminal abortion. The prosecution agreed to remove the word 'abortion' from the information. However, the Court of First Instance ordered the amendment of the information, stating that the accused should not be placed in danger of being convicted more than once for two crimes, otherwise the case would be dismissed. The Petition: The prosecution appealed the order of the Court of First Instance directing the amendment of the information.
Issue(s)
Whether the Information filed against Agapito Yap, Jr. violates the prohibition against duplicity of offenses under Section 12, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court by alleging multiple acts of intercourse and the consequence of abortion.
Ruling
The Supreme Court set aside the order appealed from and remanded the case to the court below for proceedings on the merits. It held that the information does not charge duplicity of offenses. The Court also stated that an amendment to delete the averment of abortion would be in order.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the Information did not charge more than one offense and therefore did not violate the rule against duplicity. The Court rejected the defense's theory that every single sexual encounter under the same promise of marriage constitutes a separate, consummated offense of seduction. Applying the principle in U.S. v. Salud, the Court noted that multiple acts of intercourse consented to by a woman in reliance upon the same promise do not create separate crimes unless each act resulted from a new and separate act of deceit. Furthermore, the Court explained that the phrases "sometime subsequently thereto" and "sexual intercourse several times" were merely particulars intended to provide the accused with the context of the evidence to be presented at trial. These details allow the accused to understand the timeframe against which the victim's age and virginity are reckoned. The mention of pregnancy and abortion was likewise treated as a detail of the entire incident rather than an attempt to charge a separate crime of criminal abortion. Consequently, such a narrative structure is permissible and falls under the category of a bill of particulars, which does not trigger the prohibition against duplicitous informations.
Main Doctrine
An information charging simple seduction, which includes allegations of subsequent sexual intercourse several times, pregnancy, and abortion, does not violate the prohibition against duplicity of offenses, as these details serve to elaborate on the single offense of seduction and do not constitute separate crimes.