Arong v. Seno

G.R. No. L-25295 · 1968-08-14 · J. CONCEPCION, C.J, J.: · Primary: Remedial; Secondary: Civil
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Spouses Conrada Seno and Moises Binghay (Binghays) filed a case for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage against spouses Salome M. Ceniza and Nicasio Tuñacao (Tuñacaos). The Tuñacaos filed an answer with a counterclaim. Procedural History: During the presentation of evidence by the Binghays, Mrs. Tuñacao died. Her heirs, including Concordia T. Arong (petitioner), were ordered to substitute her. The heirs filed a motion to amend the complaint to name them as defendants, which was not acted upon. Petitioner Concordia T. Arong filed an answer with a counterclaim, which was ordered stricken out. Subsequently, petitioner and her sisters filed a motion to admit an amended answer, which was denied by the respondent Judge. A motion for reconsideration was also denied. The Petition: Petitioner Concordia T. Arong filed a petition for certiorari, alleging that the respondent Judge committed a palpable abuse of discretion and acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in denying her motion to admit the amended answer. She argued that she had a right to defend herself, was the real debtor, had made payments, and thus had a right to file a compulsory counterclaim.

Issue(s)

Whether the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to admit the amended answer after the trial had commenced. Whether the petitioner is barred from asserting her alleged payments if the amended answer is not admitted.

Ruling

The petition for certiorari was dismissed, the writ prayed for was denied, and the writ of preliminary injunction was dissolved. The Supreme Court held that the respondent Judge did not err in denying the motion to admit the amended answer.

Ratio Decidendi

On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the respondent Judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion. Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, amendments to pleadings after the case has commenced require leave of court. This leave may be refused if the amendment substantially alters the defense. In this case, the petitioner sought to introduce the defense of 'usury' in her amended answer, a defense not alleged in the original answer of her deceased mother. This constituted a substantial alteration of the defense, justifying the denial of the motion to amend, especially since the case had already begun with the presentation of evidence. Therefore, the denial was a proper exercise of judicial discretion. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court clarified that the petitioner is not barred from asserting her alleged payments. The original answer of Mrs. Tuñacao stated that she was merely an 'accommodation party' for the petitioner. The Binghays claimed P23,110 was due. Under Mrs. Tuñacao's answer, the petitioner, as the accommodated party, could still present evidence of payments made by her to reduce the amount claimed by the Binghays. This could be done without the necessity of admitting the amended answer that introduced the defense of usury. Thus, the petitioner's right to prove payments was not prejudiced by the denial of the amended answer.

Main Doctrine

The Supreme Court affirmed that under Section 3 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court, an amendment to an answer filed after the commencement of trial requires leave of court. Such leave may be denied if the proposed amendment substantially alters the defense, as was the case when the petitioner sought to introduce the defense of usury, which was not present in the original answer of the deceased mother.

Access audio review, related cases, codal links, and more.

Open LexMatePH →