Municipality of Tacurong v. Abragan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On October 9, 1956, Lot No. 6001, formerly part of the public domain, was declared by Executive Proclamation No. 351 as land reserved for Municipal Site Purposes. Portions of this land were occupied by Rosario Abragan, Ramona Pirales, Teofilo Apilado, Ester Apilado for residential purposes, and the Tacurong Evangelical Church for religious purposes. Procedural History: On August 29, 1961, the Municipality of Tacurong filed a complaint for recovery of possession against the occupants who had refused repeated demands to vacate. The defendants moved to dismiss, alleging lack of cause of action because the proclamation provided for compensation for improvements and no offer of compensation was made. They also argued the complaint should have been filed by the Solicitor General. The Court of First Instance (CFI) initially ruled the complaint had a sufficient cause of action. However, upon reconsideration, citing a provision in the proclamation requiring the Municipality to make 'proper arrangements for the compensation and/or removal of said improvements,' the CFI dismissed the case, deeming these arrangements as conditions precedent not alleged in the complaint. The CFI denied reconsideration, taking judicial notice of the proclamation. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. The Petition: The Municipality of Tacurong appealed the dismissal order, questioning the sufficiency of the cause of action and the propriety of the CFI's judicial notice of the Executive Proclamation.
Issue(s)
Whether the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action for recovery of possession. Whether the lower court erred in taking judicial notice of Executive Proclamation No. 351. Whether the alleged arrangements for compensation and/or removal of improvements constituted a condition precedent to the filing of the action.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal order and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings. No costs were awarded.
Ratio Decidendi
On the sufficiency of the cause of action: The Court held that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. It noted that a lack of cause of action must be apparent on the face of the complaint, and only facts alleged therein should be considered. The complaint alleged that Executive Proclamation No. 351 reserved the land for Municipal Park Site purposes and that despite repeated notices, the defendants obstinately refused to vacate. The Court stated that the defendants' alleged right to compensation under the proclamation was a matter for them to plead as a defense in their answer and during the trial on the merits, not a prerequisite for the municipality to allege in its complaint. The Court emphasized that the complaint sufficiently alleged the reservation of the land for municipal purposes and the defendants' refusal to vacate, which constitutes a valid cause of action for recovery of possession. On the propriety of judicial notice: The Court affirmed that the lower court did not err in taking judicial notice of Executive Proclamation No. 351, as executive proclamations are among the matters within judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. This is a matter of public record and directly relevant to the case. The Court acknowledged that such proclamations are official acts of the executive department and are therefore subject to judicial notice by the courts. On the condition precedent: The Court found it an error for the lower court to consider the offer of payment as a condition precedent to the enforceability of the proclamation. The Court pointed out that the specific provision cited by the defendants mentioned 'compensation and/or removal' of improvements, indicating that payment of compensation does not always have to take place. Therefore, the municipality was not strictly required to allege prior offers of compensation as a condition precedent to filing suit. It is incumbent upon the defendants to demonstrate their entitlement to compensation, and this can be addressed during the trial on the merits. The Court clarified that the proclamation's intent was to protect occupants, but this protection did not necessarily bar legal action for possession if occupants refused to vacate.
Main Doctrine
A complaint for recovery of possession of land reserved for municipal site purposes is deemed to state a cause of action even without alleging prior offers of compensation for improvements, as the right to compensation is a matter for the defendants to plead as a defense, and the proclamation itself allows for 'and/or removal' of improvements, indicating compensation is not always a prerequisite.