Pacursa v. Del Rosario
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On February 7, 1957, Equitable Insurance & Casualty Co., Inc. issued two policies: Personal Accident Policy No. 7136 on the life of Francisco del Rosario (Paquito Bolero) with Remedios Jayme as beneficiary, and Master Accident Policy No. 7137 covering 24 members of Francisco del Rosario's vaudeville troupe, with Francisco del Rosario as beneficiary, payable to his estate if he did not survive the insured. On February 24, 1957, Francisco del Rosario and 21 members of his troupe perished in a fire on the motor launch "Islamia" and subsequently drowned. Simeon del Rosario, father and heir of Francisco del Rosario, claimed the proceeds. An agreement was reached between Simeon del Rosario and Equitable for a test case on Policy No. 7136, with Policy No. 7137 to be governed by its outcome. Simeon del Rosario sued Equitable on Policy No. 7136, and the trial court awarded P3,000, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Simeon del Rosario then filed Civil Case No. 2419-P against Equitable for the proceeds of Master Accident Policy No. 7137, due to Equitable's refusal to honor the alleged covenant. Procedural History: On December 7, 1965, Perla C. Pacursa moved to intervene in Civil Case No. 2419-P, claiming to be the heir of Perfecto Pacursa and Adolfo Pacursa, both members of the troupe covered by Policy No. 7137, and asserting that other intervenors were heirs of other deceased troupe members. The motion was set for hearing and submitted for resolution on December 24, 1965. Notably, defendant Equitable had completed its evidence presentation on December 8, 1965, and trial ended that day, one day after the motion to intervene was filed. The Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal denied the motion for intervention on December 27, 1965, citing Section 2, Rule 12 of the New Rules of Court, as the hearing had already terminated. Reconsideration was denied on January 12, 1966. Perla Pacursa filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals (CA) to annul the CFI orders. The CA issued a temporary restraining order on March 17, 1966. On June 27, 1966, the CA dismissed Pacursa's petition, dissolving the temporary restraining order. Reconsideration was refused on July 20, 1966. Meanwhile, Civil Case No. 2419-P proceeded, and the CFI rendered judgment on November 8, 1966, ordering Equitable to pay Simeon del Rosario P63,000. Equitable appealed to the CA. On November 11, 1967, the CA dismissed Equitable's appeal for failure to show on its face that it was perfected within the period. Reconsideration was denied on January 17, 1968. Equitable appealed this dismissal to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-28714), which was denied due course on April 1, 1968, though a motion for reconsideration was still pending. The Petition: Perla C. Pacursa filed the present appeal by way of certiorari, praying for the reversal of the CA's decision dismissing her petition for intervention, arguing that the CFI abused its discretion in refusing intervention and that the CA erred in sustaining the CFI.
Issue(s)
Did the Court of First Instance of Rizal abuse its discretion in refusing to allow intervention in Civil Case 2419-P? Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the trial court's denial of intervention?
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 27, 1966, in CA-G.R. No. 37247-R, dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus, and its order of July 20, 1966, denying reconsideration, are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not abuse its discretion in refusing intervention. The Court's decision was based on three primary reasons. Firstly, the petitioner, Perla C. Pacursa, was found guilty of laches; she and others similarly situated waited over eight years from the accident date (February 24, 1957) to seek intervention on December 7, 1965, long after the two-year policy stipulation for filing actions and over two years after Simeon del Rosario commenced his suit. This extensive delay was deemed inexcusable and would cause injustice to Simeon del Rosario, who had diligently pursued his claim. The Court emphasized that a party desiring to intervene must do so within a reasonable time and not make an 'eleventh-hour effort.' On Issue 2: The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court, for the second and third reasons articulated by the Supreme Court. Secondly, allowing intervention would indeed cause undue delay and prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. The petitioner's claim that she could present her evidence in two or three sittings was dismissed as unrealistic, considering she purported to represent 19 other individuals. Proving that Francisco del Rosario predeceased each of these individuals, as required by the policy, would be a huge, time-consuming task, especially with the accident occurring in Jolo and the court sitting in Rizal, involving tremendous expenses and the treachery of memory over time. The Court also noted that the complaint-in-intervention lacked an allegation that the 21 insured persons survived Paquito Bolero, the policy's beneficiary, thus being denuded of equitable grounds. Lastly, the Court of First Instance of Rizal was already powerless to grant intervention because the motion for intervention was filed on December 7, 1965, but the trial, defined as the period for the introduction of evidence, had already terminated on December 8, 1965. By December 11, 1965, when the motion was set for hearing, the trial had concluded. Under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, intervention is only permitted 'before or during a trial.' Furthermore, by November 8, 1966, the CFI had already rendered judgment in the principal case, which judgment was subsequently affirmed by dismissal of appeal by the CA and denial of review by the SC. With the lower court having lost jurisdiction over the main case, which had essentially entered the execution stage, intervention, being an ancillary action, was no longer possible.
Main Doctrine
A motion for intervention filed after the termination of the trial, especially when it would cause undue delay and prejudice to the original parties, and when the intervenor's rights can be protected in a separate proceeding, may be denied. Furthermore, a court loses jurisdiction to grant intervention once it has rendered judgment on the merits and the case is on appeal.