Lidasan v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. L-28473 · 1968-03-06 · J. BENGZON, J.P., J.: · Primary: Political; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Petitioner Tahir Lidasan, a mayoralty candidate in Parang, Cotabato, filed a special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction against the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Lidasan assailed the COMELEC's order to canvass election returns from Precincts 15, 16, 23, and 24, which the municipal board of canvassers had initially rejected as manufactured, applying the statistical probability rule from Lagumbay v. Climaco. The municipal board reversed its decision upon COMELEC's order. Procedural History: After filing the instant certiorari case, petitioner Lidasan also filed an election protest in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato against his opposing candidate, Sansaluna Biruar, alleging terrorism, fraud, anomalies, irregularities, and violations of election law in several precincts, including those whose returns were in question. Respondent Biruar moved to dismiss the certiorari case, arguing it was moot and academic due to the election protest. The Petition: Lidasan sought to nullify the COMELEC's order to canvass the disputed returns and all related proceedings. He contended that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

Issue(s)

Whether a special civil action for certiorari is the proper remedy when a plain and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as an election protest, is available. Whether the doctrine established in Lagumbay v. Climaco regarding manufactured election returns based on statistical probability applies to the returns in question.

Ruling

The petition for certiorari is dismissed. The Supreme Court found that petitioner had a plain and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law through an election protest, which he had already filed. Furthermore, the Court held that the doctrine in Lagumbay v. Climaco was not applicable to the facts of the case, and thus, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the COMELEC.

Ratio Decidendi

On the availability of a plain and speedy remedy: The Court held that a special civil action of certiorari does not lie where a plain and speedy remedy exists in the ordinary course of law, as provided by Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Lidasan had filed an election protest in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, which is considered an ordinary remedy. Since a litigant cannot avail of both a special civil action and an ordinary remedy simultaneously for the same purpose, the present action for certiorari could not prosper. The Court noted that Lidasan had not shown or contended that the remedy of protest was not speedy or adequate enough for his purpose. On the applicability of the Lagumbay v. Climaco doctrine: The Court found that the doctrine in Lagumbay v. Climaco did not apply to the returns in question. The Lagumbay doctrine contemplated a situation where election returns showed a total of 100% voting for all candidates of one party and zero for those of the other. In the present case, while the returns showed zero votes for petitioner Lidasan and practically all votes for respondent Biruar for mayor, candidates of both major parties for other offices, such as Senators, received a substantial number of votes in the same returns. Moreover, returns from other precincts showed the reverse, with Lidasan receiving practically all the votes and Biruar having zero. Therefore, the returns did not present the extreme statistical anomaly that warranted the application of the Lagumbay doctrine. Consequently, the Court concluded that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the COMELEC in ordering the inclusion of these returns in the canvass.

Main Doctrine

A special civil action for certiorari does not lie where a plain and speedy remedy exists in the ordinary course of law, such as an election protest. Furthermore, the doctrine on manufactured election returns based on statistical probability, as established in Lagumbay v. Climaco, is not applicable when the returns in question, while showing a disproportionate number of votes for one candidate for mayor, also show substantial votes for candidates of both major parties for other offices, and when returns from other precincts show the reverse.

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