Dizon v. Tizon
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the election for the office of Governor of Bataan in the November 14, 1967 elections. Three candidates vied for the position: Pedro R. Dizon (the petitioner), Guillermo Arcenas, and Medina Lacson de Leon (the respondents). 2. Procedural History: Petitioner Dizon filed three separate petitions for judicial recount in the Court of First Instance of Bataan. Case No. 80, concerning precincts in Balanga and Hermosa, was dismissed on January 12, 1968. Cases Nos. 83 and 84, pertaining to precincts in Abucay and Balanga, were dismissed on January 15, 1968, upon motion by the respondents. These dismissals led to the present petitions for certiorari, mandamus, and/or prohibition before the Supreme Court. 3. The Petition: The petitioner seeks a reversal of the lower court's decisions and an order for a judicial recount of votes in specific precincts. The petitions argue that discrepancies in election returns, particularly concerning the vote counts for Guillermo Arcenas in precincts of Balanga and Hermosa, materially affect the election outcome. The petitioner contends that these discrepancies warrant a recount to ensure the accurate determination of the winning candidate.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in denying a judicial recount with respect to Precinct No. 5 of Balanga and Precinct No. 10 of Hermosa. Whether the discrepancies alleged in the election returns satisfy the requirement of Section 163 of the Revised Election Code that a discrepancy "affects the result" to justify a judicial recount. Whether the trial court correctly dismissed Cases Nos. 83 and 84 for lack of jurisdiction because the provincial canvass had already been completed. Whether the trial court correctly dismissed Cases Nos. 83 and 84 on the ground of splitting a single cause of action. Whether the issuance of the writs of certiorari, mandamus and/or prohibition and the preliminary injunction were warranted under the circumstances.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the recount for the precincts in question and in dismissing the other petitions for lack of jurisdiction and for splitting a single cause of action. The restraining order issued earlier is lifted, with costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the trial court erred in denying a recount for Precinct No. 5 (Balanga) and Precinct No. 10 (Hermosa): The Court found that in Precinct No. 5 the discrepancy of one vote did not materially affect the result, and under Section 163 a difference must be such as to affect the result to justify a recount. With respect to Precinct No. 10 the Court observed that three official copies (municipal treasurer, provincial treasurer, and Commission on Elections copy) consistently showed the same figures and that the alleged erasures were corrections in the same handwriting, identified as clerical rectifications by the supervisor of the Commission on Elections. The Court held that the advance municipal treasurer's copy, which differed, is not one of the copies which can be the basis of a recount, citing Acuña v. Golez and Palarca v. Arieta. The concurrence of the three official copies with the tally board further supported the trial court's factual finding that no tampering or fraud was shown. On these legal and factual grounds the denial of recounts for these precincts was affirmed as within the trial court's discretion. On Whether discrepancies satisfy Section 163's "affects the result" requirement: The Court emphasized that Section 163 authorizes judicial recount "in case it appears to the provincial board of canvassers that another copy or other authentic copies of the statement from an election precinct submitted to the board give to a candidate a different number of votes and the difference affects the result of the election." The Court reasoned that a mere numerical variance that cannot change the outcome is insufficient. The Court also explained that the law contemplates that discrepancies be evidenced among the authentic copies and that the difference be material to the determination of the winner. The requirement protects the summary nature of the proceeding and prevents needless disruption of canvass procedures. The Court therefore upheld the trial court's application of the statutory standard. On Lack of Jurisdiction because canvass had been completed (Cases Nos. 83 and 84): The Court found that for Cases Nos. 83 and 84 the provincial board of canvassers had already completed the canvass on December 5 and 6, and no question was then raised in connection with those returns. The Court held that Section 163 presupposes that discrepancies be brought to the attention of the board "in the process of the canvass" so that the board may act. Where the canvass has been terminated and no timely question raised, the remedy of judicial recount under Section 163 is not available. The Court concluded that the trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction in dismissing those petitions for lack of jurisdiction. On Splitting of a Single Cause of Action: The Court explained that a judicial recount under Section 163, regardless of the number of precincts involved, constitutes only one cause of action because the ground and relief are the same. The Court emphasized the summary character of the proceeding and public policy against piecemeal litigation, holding that filing separate petitions for different precincts in installments would defeat the objective of prompt final identification and proclamation of the winner. The dismissal of the multiple, separate petitions therefore did not amount to grave abuse of discretion. On the Appropriateness of Extraordinary Writs and Preliminary Injunction: The Court held that because the trial court acted within its discretion and followed the statutory prerequisites, there was no grave abuse of discretion warranting issuance of certiorari, mandamus or prohibition. Consequently, the extraordinary relief and the restraining order previously issued were not justified and were lifted, with costs.
Main Doctrine
Under Section 163 of the Revised Election Code a judicial recount is authorized only when authentic copies of the precinct statement show a discrepancy that affects the result of the election; advance municipal treasurer's copies are not a basis for recount, and a judicial recount constitutes a single cause of action so that separate piecemeal petitions for the same relief are impermissible.