Cruz v. Government Service Insurance System
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Filemon Cruz, employed as a clerk expediter by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) since 1951, faced administrative charges for "misconduct or dishonesty" in July 1960, leading to his preventive suspension. The GSIS subsequently filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of commercial and public documents, and later, an information was filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. This criminal case was dismissed on July 28, 1962, upon motion of the fiscal, who found petitioner not connected with the case. However, the CFI denied his motion for reinstatement with back pay. Petitioner then requested reinstatement from GSIS, which was refused due to another pending criminal case for estafa in the CFI of Bulacan. This second criminal case was dismissed on February 5, 1963, with the CFI ordering petitioner's reinstatement with salary payment. Petitioner notified GSIS of this dismissal and requested reinstatement, which was again refused. Procedural History: Petitioner filed an original action of mandamus for reinstatement with back pay. The respondent GSIS, in its Answer, countered that petitioner's allegations were untrue and that he had been found guilty in the administrative charges and separated from service after due hearing, where he testified and was represented by counsel. The GSIS submitted records showing that the administrative charges were formally heard by its 3-member Special Board of Inquiry, where petitioner presented evidence and testified. The Board found petitioner guilty of dishonesty and acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service and recommended his separation from the service with prejudice to reinstatement, effective from his preventive suspension date. The GSIS Board of Trustees approved this recommendation on March 15, 1961, and petitioner was advised of his separation. The GSIS also clarified that the administrative case and the criminal case in Manila involved different checks, and the Bulacan case was unrelated. The GSIS refused reinstatement after the Manila case dismissal not due to the Bulacan case's pendency, but because petitioner had already been separated since March 1961. Furthermore, the GSIS pointed out that the Bulacan CFI's order for reinstatement was later deleted upon the fiscal's motion, as it was beyond the court's authority. The Petition: Petitioner, in his verified petition, represented that he was under continuous suspension since July 1960, had not been given an opportunity to defend himself, and that his separation was unlawful. He sought reinstatement with back pay through a writ of mandamus.
Issue(s)
Whether a writ of mandamus should be issued to compel the reinstatement of an employee who was "considered resigned" following an administrative investigation. Whether the petitioner and his counsel should be penalized for suppressing material facts in their verified petition.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. Petitioner Filemon Cruz was legally separated from the service of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for cause, effective from the date of his preventive suspension on July 26, 1960, after due hearing where he appeared and was duly represented by counsel. Respondent GSIS owed him no duty of reinstatement, enforceable by the writ of mandamus. Treble costs are imposed against petitioner and his counsel.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court ruled that mandamus does not lie because the petitioner was not unlawfully excluded from his position. Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, mandamus requires a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent and a corresponding clear legal right on the part of the petitioner. In this case, Filemon Cruz was legally separated for cause effective July 26, 1960. The administrative proceedings conducted by the Special Board of Inquiry provided him with due process, as he testified on his own behalf and was represented by counsel. The GSIS Board of Trustees acted within its authority when it approved the recommendation to consider him resigned due to "dishonesty" and "acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service." The Court specifically noted that the penalty of being "considered resigned" is a recognized form of dismissal from service; thus, the respondent had no duty to reinstate a person who had already been legally terminated. On Issue 2: The Court found that the petitioner and his counsel, Atty. Antonino de los Reyes, willfully suppressed material facts to mislead the Court into giving the petition due course. By alleging that the petitioner was under "continuous suspension" and denied the opportunity to defend himself, they omitted the crucial fact that an administrative decision for his dismissal had already been rendered and communicated to him. The Court emphasized that the rule of law requires orders to be based on a full and candid disclosure of relevant matters. Members of the Bar have an exacting responsibility to exert the utmost diligence to ensure that their pleadings reflect the truth. Because the counsel failed to exhibit the candor required of an officer of the Court and filed a petition that was clearly bereft of support in law, the Court applied Rule 142, Section 3, and imposed treble costs against both the petitioner and his counsel as a penalty for their lack of candor.
Main Doctrine
A petition for mandamus for reinstatement will be dismissed if the petitioner was legally separated from service after due process, and the petition was filed with suppression of material facts and misleading allegations.