Dacanay v. Alvendia

G.R. No. L-22633 · 1969-10-31 · J. CASTRO, J.: · Primary: Remedial; Secondary: Civil
REITERATION

Facts

1. The Antecedents: Julian B. Dacanay filed a complaint against Consolidated Mines, Inc. seeking payment of a contingent fee for auditing services rendered in gathering evidence for a prior case. Dacanay alleged these services related to identifying shortages in chrome ore inventories, anomalies in salary payments, and fictitious ore hauling. Consolidated Mines, Inc. moved to dismiss, asserting Dacanay lacked legal capacity to sue and had released his claim. 2. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance initially deferred ruling on the motion to dismiss. After the respondent corporation filed its answer and counterclaims, and the parties agreed at pre-trial that the sole issue was whether the corporation recovered specific amounts related to the alleged services, the case proceeded. Dacanay filed several amended complaints, which the respondent court repeatedly found insufficient or contradictory to prior agreements. The court dismissed Dacanay's second amended complaint on October 23, 1963, finding it non-compliant with prior orders. A motion for reconsideration was denied on December 14, 1963. Dacanay filed a notice of appeal on January 2, 1964, which the respondent court dismissed on January 23, 1964, deeming the motion for reconsideration pro forma and the appeal untimely filed. A subsequent motion for reconsideration of this dismissal was also denied. 3. The Petition: Dacanay filed an original action for mandamus with the Supreme Court, seeking to compel the respondent Judge to give due course to his appeal. He argued that his motion for reconsideration dated November 21, 1963, was not pro forma and therefore suspended the period for appeal. The Supreme Court, however, found that Dacanay's repeated attempts to amend his complaint and his persistent arguments, despite multiple adverse rulings from the lower court, rendered his final motion for reconsideration pro forma. Consequently, the Court held that the appeal was indeed filed out of time and denied the petition for mandamus.

Issue(s)

Whether the motion for reconsideration dated November 21, 1963, was pro forma. Whether the appeal was filed within the reglementary period.

Ruling

The petition for mandamus is denied. The Supreme Court upholds the dismissal of the petitioner's appeal by the lower court.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of whether the motion for reconsideration dated November 21, 1963, was pro forma: The Court ruled that the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner on November 21, 1963, was indeed pro forma. This conclusion was reached after a meticulous review of the procedural history of the case, which showed repeated attempts by the petitioner to amend his complaint and to have his allegations considered sufficient, despite adverse rulings from the trial court. The petitioner's first amended complaint was admitted, but a subsequent quantum meruit cause of action was dismissed, and he was ordered to amend the first cause of action to allege specific facts supporting his claim regarding recovered amounts from Benguet Consolidated Mining Company. The petitioner's subsequent motions for reconsideration and amended complaints consistently reiterated arguments and allegations that had already been rejected by the court. The Court emphasized that a motion for reconsideration is considered pro forma if it merely reiterates arguments already considered and rejected by the court, without presenting new substantial grounds or authorities that fundamentally alter the legal landscape. The petitioner's insistence on the sufficiency of his amended complaints, even after three previous adverse rulings, demonstrated a pattern of rehashing arguments, rendering his subsequent motion for reconsideration pro forma. The Court cited established jurisprudence, such as Samudio vs. Mun. of Gainza, Cam. Sur. and Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo, which hold that a motion for reconsideration that has no other purpose than to gain time or is a mere repetition of previous contentions does not suspend the period for appeal. On the issue of whether the appeal was filed within the reglementary period: As a consequence of the finding that the motion for reconsideration dated November 21, 1963, was pro forma, it did not suspend the running of the reglementary period for appeal. The petitioner received the order dismissing his second amended complaint on October 28, 1963. Under the Rules of Court, the period to appeal is 30 days. Therefore, the reglementary period for filing an appeal expired on November 27, 1963. The petitioner, however, filed his notice of appeal only on January 2, 1964, which is 36 days beyond the expiration of the period. The Court also noted another ground for dismissing the appeal, which was the deficiency in the record on appeal, as it did not entirely reproduce the pleadings before the court, contrary to the Rules of Court, and Section 7 of Rule 41 prescribes a ten-day period to correct such deficiencies. Given that the appeal was filed out of time and the record on appeal was deficient, the Supreme Court found no error in the lower court's dismissal of the appeal and, consequently, denied the petition for mandamus.

Main Doctrine

A motion for reconsideration that merely reiterates arguments previously rejected by the court, without presenting new substantial grounds or authorities that fundamentally alter the legal landscape, is considered pro forma and does not suspend the reglementary period for appeal.

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