Garrido v. Enriquez

G.R. No. L-23833 · 1969-10-31 · J. MAKALINTAL, J.: · Primary: Remedial; Secondary: Civil
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Defendant Simeona Javier received two pieces of jewelry from plaintiff Jose Garrido on September 20, 1947, under a receipt stipulating that she would sell them for P1,800.00 or return them, along with the said amount, on or before October 1, 1947. Javier failed to return the jewelry or pay the value. Procedural History: A criminal case for estafa was filed against Javier on December 16, 1947. While pending, Javier requested to pay in installments, leading to a provisional dismissal on March 22, 1948, with the plaintiff's consent. Javier defaulted on installments, prompting the revival of the criminal case on January 12, 1950. The case was again sent to the files without prejudice on July 6, 1950, due to the accused's non-apprehension. Upon Javier's apprehension in January 1959, the criminal case was revived. The plaintiff reserved his right to institute a separate civil action on February 18, 1959, and filed the instant civil case for the recovery of P1,800.00 on February 20, 1959. Javier was later acquitted in the criminal case on October 2, 1959, for failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Appeal: The defendants-appellants contended that the plaintiff's cause of action had prescribed, arguing that the prescriptive period began on October 1, 1947, and expired before the civil complaint was filed on February 20, 1959. The plaintiff-appellee argued that the institution and pendency of the criminal case, including its revival, interrupted the prescriptive period for the civil action.

Issue(s)

Whether the plaintiff's civil action for the recovery of the value of the jewelry had already prescribed at the time of its filing on February 20, 1959.

Ruling

The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, holding that the plaintiff's cause of action had not prescribed. The institution of the criminal action for estafa on December 16, 1947, impliedly instituted the civil action for recovery of civil liability, thereby suspending the prescriptive period. The subsequent provisional dismissal and revival of the criminal case further maintained the suspension of the prescriptive period for the civil action until the plaintiff expressly reserved his right to institute it separately.

Ratio Decidendi

On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the civil action was not barred by prescription because the filing of the criminal case for estafa on December 16, 1947, impliedly included the civil action for recovery of civil liability. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, the civil aspect is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party expressly waives or reserves it. Since Garrido did not reserve the right to file a separate civil action until February 18, 1959, the civil liability was legally kept alive by its pendency within the criminal proceedings. The Court calculated that the prescriptive period only ran during the following intervals: from the accrual of the cause of action (October 1, 1947) to the filing of the information (December 16, 1947); from the provisional dismissal (March 22, 1948) to the revival of the case (January 12, 1950); and from the reservation of the civil action (February 18, 1959) to the filing of the civil complaint (February 20, 1959). The aggregate duration of these periods was significantly less than the ten-year prescriptive period required by law for an action based on a written contract or an obligation created by law. Therefore, the defense of prescription raised by the appellants was without merit, as the pendency of the criminal case effectively tolled the period for the civil action.

Main Doctrine

When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed impliedly instituted, unless expressly waived or reserved. The pendency of this criminal action, even with periods of provisional dismissal and subsequent revival, serves to suspend the running of the prescriptive period for the civil action, preventing prescription from barring the claim.

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