Marella v. Reyes
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Gliceria Marella (plaintiff) filed an action against Vicente Reyes, administrator of the intestate estate of Filomeno Encarnacion, and Jose T. Paterno, seeking the exclusion of four parcels of land from the inventory of the deceased's estate, claiming they were her property. The administrator did not oppose the claim, but Jose T. Paterno, a creditor, intervened. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Batangas rendered a judgment adverse to the plaintiff. The judge based his decision largely on the rejection of the plaintiff's testimony, citing Section 383(7) of Act No. 190, which prohibits parties against an executor or administrator from testifying as to matters occurring before the death of the deceased. The judge found that the plaintiff's testimony concerned acts that took place before Filomeno Encarnacion's death. The Petition: The plaintiff appealed the decision, primarily questioning the propriety of the intervention and the exclusion of her testimony.
Issue(s)
Was the intervention of Jose T. Paterno proper? Should the real property claimed by the plaintiff have been excluded from the inventory?
Ruling
The judgment of the Court of the First Instance is reversed. The land should have been excluded from the inventory, and the plaintiff should have her relief. No costs are awarded for this instance.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of the intervention: The Court held that the intervention, though made by motion rather than a cross-complaint as literally suggested by Section 121 of the Code of Civil Procedure, was proper. The Court reasoned that it allows such interventions when the defendant unites in accordance with the nature of the remedy, citing a previous case where a similar procedure was sustained. The intervenor did not lose the benefit of the order of intervention by reason of his subsequent motion to be substituted, which was properly denied. On the exclusion of the real property from the inventory: The Court found that the judge erred in disregarding the plaintiff's testimony solely on the basis of Section 383(7) of Act No. 190. The Court explained that the omission to object to the competency of a witness operates as a waiver of the right to object. The judge has no power to disregard testimony on his own motion if it was not objected to by the opposing party during the trial. The disqualification of witnesses under such rules is for the convenience of litigants and lies within their control. The plaintiff's testimony, corroborated by other witnesses and confirmed by the widow's statements to a creditor, established an oral agreement where the land was given as security for a debt, with the condition that half the crop would go to the plaintiff. The Court affirmed that such a contract, even if oral, was valid, and the delivery of title deeds constituted delivery of the property, citing relevant articles of the Civil Code and previous jurisprudence.
Main Doctrine
The omission to object to the competency of a witness operates as a waiver of the right to object, and the judge cannot disregard the testimony on the sole ground that it could have been excluded if objected to.