Mara v. Ace Lumber
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the timeliness of an appeal. Ace Lumber Co., Inc. (appellant) had its appeal dismissed by the Court of Appeals for failing to submit its printed record on appeal within the allotted time. The dismissal resolution was received by the appellant on March 22, 1966. 2. Procedural History: On April 6, 1966, fifteen days after receiving the dismissal notice, the appellant filed a motion for reconsideration. This motion was denied, and the appellant received notice of the denial on April 9, 1966. The following day, April 10, 1966, the appellant filed a second motion for reconsideration with leave of court. The Court of Appeals granted this second motion and reinstated the appeal. Mara, Inc. (appellee) argued that the second motion was filed on the sixteenth day, rendering the original dismissal final and executory. 3. The Petition: Mara, Inc. filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in reinstating the appeal. The core issue is whether the second motion for reconsideration was timely filed. The petitioner contends that the rules regarding the computation of appeal periods, specifically as interpreted in Lloren vs. De Veyra and incorporated into Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, do not apply to the finality of orders of dismissal. The petitioner seeks to have the Supreme Court declare the appeal's dismissal final and executory.
Issue(s)
Whether the filing of a second motion for reconsideration with leave of court, after the first motion was denied, is permissible and tolls the reglementary period for appeal. Whether the appeal was perfected within the reglementary period, considering the filing of the motions for reconsideration.
Ruling
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. The Court of Appeals did not commit an abuse of discretion in reinstating the appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the reglementary period and the effect of motions for reconsideration: The Court reiterated its ruling in Lloren vs. De Veyra. When a motion for reconsideration is filed on the last day of the period to perfect an appeal, that day is excluded from the computation. Consequently, the period to appeal begins to run again from the day after the party receives notice of the denial of the motion. This principle is now embodied in Section 3, paragraph 2 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court (1964). On the issue of finality of the dismissal order: The Court held that the appeal was perfected within the reglementary period. The appellant filed its first motion for reconsideration on the fifteenth day. Under the prevailing rule, this day is excluded in the computation of the period. Therefore, upon receipt of the denial of the first motion on April 9, 1966, the appellant still had one day to perfect its appeal. The filing of the second motion for reconsideration with leave of court on April 10, 1966, was within this remaining period, and the Court of Appeals correctly reinstated the appeal. The Court found no reason to depart from the uniform method of computing periods under similar circumstances, as established in the Lloren case, to avoid confusion and ensure consistency in determining the finality of orders.
Main Doctrine
A motion for reconsideration filed on the last day of the period to appeal tolls the reglementary period, and the appeal may be perfected within the day following the receipt of notice of denial of the motion, in accordance with the rules on computation of periods.