Philippine National Bank v. Philippine Milling
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute involved two consolidated cases. The first, filed by Philippine Milling Co., Inc. against the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), Philippine National Bank (PNB), and the Register of Deeds of Mindoro Occidental, sought dismissal. The second case, filed by DBP against Philippine Milling Co., et al., ordered the transfer of 15,000 shares of stock from Hector Torres and Francisco Gomez to DBP, with costs against the defendants. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision in Civil Cases Nos. 42133 and 42322. Philippine Milling Co., Inc., Francisco Gomez, Hector Torres, and Federico Santiago appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellants were granted several extensions to file their brief. After the last granted extension expired, they sought a further extension, which was granted by the Court of Appeals despite objections and motions to dismiss filed by DBP and PNB. Subsequently, the Court of Appeals denied motions to dismiss and a motion for reconsideration. The Petition: The Philippine National Bank and the Development Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the Supreme Court. They sought to annul resolutions of the Court of Appeals that denied their motions to dismiss the appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 35253-R and 35254-R. The petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals lost jurisdiction to proceed with the appeals once the extended deadline for filing the brief had passed, asserting it was a ministerial duty to dismiss the appeals. They also sought to prohibit the Court of Appeals from hearing the cases and to compel it to dismiss the appeals.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals lost jurisdiction to try the case and had a ministerial duty to dismiss the appeal upon the expiration of the last granted extension for filing the appellants' brief. Whether the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in granting a further extension and denying the motions to dismiss the appeal.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed, and the writs prayed for are denied.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of jurisdiction and ministerial duty to dismiss the appeal: The Court held that Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, which allows the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal for failure to file the brief within the reglementary period, confers a power and does not impose a duty. This provision is directory, not mandatory. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not lose jurisdiction upon the expiration of the extension, nor did it have a ministerial duty to dismiss the appeal. The provision explicitly states that an appeal may be dismissed, indicating discretion on the part of the appellate court. The petitioners' assertion that it was a ministerial duty is devoid of legal foundation. On the issue of abuse of discretion: The Court found that the petitioners failed to satisfactorily show that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion. The discretion granted to the Court of Appeals under the Rules of Court must be a sound one, exercised in accordance with justice and fair play, considering the circumstances of each case. The presumption is that the Court of Appeals exercised its discretion soundly. Since the petitioners' argument for abuse of discretion was predicated solely on the alleged "ministerial" duty to dismiss, which the Court found to be non-existent, their claim of abuse of discretion was not sufficiently substantiated. The Court cited Viuda de Ordoveza v. Raymundo and Alquiza v. Alquiza in support of its position on the discretionary nature of dismissing appeals.
Main Doctrine
The Court of Appeals has the discretion to dismiss an appeal for failure to file the brief within the reglementary period, and this discretion is not a ministerial duty. The presumption is that such discretion has been exercised soundly, and the petitioners must satisfactorily show an abuse of discretion.