People v. Atras

G.R. No. L-27267 · 1969-05-29 · J. DIZON, J.: · Primary: Criminal; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: An information for murder was filed against Diosdado de Atras, Arrostre Callanga, Macario Gorospe, Faustino Valeroso, Jose Encarnacion, and Rodolfo Bernardo. The prosecution opposed the motion for bail filed by the defendants, presenting testimonies which were to be considered as evidence for the trial on the merits. Procedural History: The prosecution filed a motion to discharge defendant Rodolfo Bernardo to be used as a state witness, alleging his testimony was necessary to prove conspiracy and his willingness to testify. The respondent judge initially held the ruling in abeyance. Subsequently, after the cross-examination of a prosecution witness, the prosecution requested a final ruling on the motion. The respondent judge denied the motion, citing Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court and jurisprudence, stating that the discharge should only be availed of if there is absolute necessity or if the accused is the only one with knowledge of the crime, not when the testimony would merely corroborate existing evidence. The court noted that three prosecution witnesses had already testified and identified the accused, and that the purpose of discharging Bernardo was to prove conspiracy. The Petition: The People of the Philippines filed an original petition for certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, seeking to order the respondent judge to discharge Rodolfo Bernardo so he could testify as a state witness.

Issue(s)

Did the respondent judge commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to discharge Rodolfo Bernardo as a state witness under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court?

Ruling

The petition is denied and the case is dismissed. The writ prayed for is denied.

Ratio Decidendi

On Issue 1: The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to discharge Rodolfo Bernardo. The Court emphasized that the discharge of an accused to be utilized as a state witness is expressly left to the sound discretion of the trial court, as provided in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. This discretion, however, is not arbitrary but must be exercised with due regard for the correct administration of justice and strict compliance with the conditions prescribed by law. One of the crucial conditions is the 'absolute necessity' of the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested, a condition that is not met when the testimony would simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen existing evidence. The Court noted that in this case, three prosecution witnesses, namely Luciano Omus, Salvador Tambagahan, and Guillerma Vda. de Cruz, had already testified and identified the defendants as having participated in the shooting incident. Given the existence of direct evidence from these witnesses, the trial court correctly found that there was no 'absolute necessity' for Bernardo's testimony to prove the commission of the offense or even conspiracy among the accused. Therefore, the respondent judge's exercise of discretion, being in line with established jurisprudence (e.g., People vs. Ibañez, People vs. Borja), did not amount to grave abuse.

Main Doctrine

The discharge of a defendant to be utilized as a state witness under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court, to be exercised only when there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused, or when the accused is the only one who has knowledge of the crime, and not when the testimony would merely corroborate or strengthen existing evidence.

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