Malag v. Cientos
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Araceli Malag, the duly elected mayor of Magsaysay, Davao, was charged with serious misconduct in office by a barrio captain. Respondent Ramon de los Cientos, the Provincial Governor, required Mayor Malag to answer the charges and subsequently issued an order of preventive suspension, directing Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Coong to assume the post. Procedural History: Mayor Malag refused to relinquish office, arguing the preventive suspension order lacked legal basis. She filed a petition for prohibition with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Davao and secured a preliminary injunction. However, the CFI, after hearing, found the suspension order valid, granted the governor's motion to dismiss, and dissolved the injunction. Mayor Malag's motion for reconsideration was denied. The Petition: Mayor Malag appealed to the Supreme Court, assailing the CFI's decision which upheld the validity of the preventive suspension order.
Issue(s)
Whether the order of preventive suspension issued by the Provincial Governor against the municipal mayor was valid under the Decentralization Act of 1967 (Republic Act No. 5185). Whether the dissolution of the preliminary injunction by the Court of First Instance was proper.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao dated September 10, 1968. It declared the order of preventive suspension by Governor de los Cientos, as well as the directive to the Vice-Mayor to assume the mayor's functions, null and void. Respondents were prohibited from enforcing the suspension order.
Ratio Decidendi
On the validity of the preventive suspension order: The Court held that the order of preventive suspension issued by Governor de los Cientos was not in accord with law and was therefore invalid. This ruling was based on the Supreme Court's prior decision in Sarcos vs. Governor Castillo, which clarified the effect of the Decentralization Act of 1967 (Republic Act No. 5185). The said Act removed the power of preventive suspension of municipal officials from the Provincial Governor and vested it in the Provincial Board. Therefore, any exercise of this power by the Governor after the effectivity of RA 5185 was without legal warrant. The Court emphasized that the reasons set out at length in the Sarcos decision were applicable and need not be repeated. On the propriety of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction: As a corollary to the invalidity of the preventive suspension order, the directive authorizing the Vice-Mayor to assume the functions of the mayor was also declared null and void. Consequently, the dissolution of the preliminary injunction by the court below, which was premised on the validity of the suspension, was erroneous. The Court noted that respondents sought dismissal of the case as moot, claiming the Provincial Board had found Mayor Malag guilty, but this was arrested by higher executive authority. Furthermore, during the pendency of the appeal, the CFI of Davao had reconsidered its opinion and reinstated the injunction, rendering the issue of the injunction's propriety moot in light of the Supreme Court's reversal of the dismissal order.
Main Doctrine
The power of preventive suspension of municipal officials was removed from the Provincial Governor and vested in the Provincial Board by virtue of the Decentralization Act of 1967 (Republic Act No. 5185). Consequently, an order of preventive suspension issued by a Provincial Governor after the effectivity of RA 5185 is invalid.