Sarcos v. Castillo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Domingo N. Sarcos, the elected Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, was charged with misconduct and dishonesty in office by respondent Provincial Governor Recaredo Castillo. The alleged offense involved conniving with private individuals to cut and sell timber from the municipality's communal forest reserve, causing damage to the public and the government. The charge was initially filed with the Provincial Board, and the petitioner admitted to selling seized logs to raise funds for police uniforms and arms. Procedural History: Following the filing of an administrative complaint by the Provincial Governor, the Petitioner was ordered preventively suspended from his position as Mayor. The Governor justified this action by stating that the charges affected the Petitioner's official integrity and that immediate suspension was necessary under Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967. The Petitioner, however, challenges the Governor's authority to issue such an order. The Petition: This petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to annul the preventive suspension order issued by the Provincial Governor. The core of the petition hinges on the interpretation of Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967, specifically whether the power of preventive suspension of a municipal mayor against whom charges have been filed is still vested in the provincial governor. The Petitioner argues that this power has been withdrawn from the provincial governor and now resides with the provincial board, as per the revised statutory provisions.
Issue(s)
Whether the Provincial Governor is still vested with the power to order the preventive suspension of an elective municipal mayor under the Decentralization Act of 1967.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the writs prayed for, annulled and set aside the preventive suspension order issued by respondent Governor Castillo, and ordered the immediate reinstatement of petitioner to his position as Municipal Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur. The Provincial Board was strictly enjoined to act in accordance with applicable law in disposing of the administrative complaint.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the power of preventive suspension is no longer with the Provincial Governor. Applying the principle of 'Strict Construction,' the Court noted that Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185 (RA 5185) expressly declares that the suspension and removal of elective local officials shall be governed 'exclusively' by said section. Unlike the former Revised Administrative Code, which allowed the Governor to suspend municipal officials if the charge affected their official integrity, RA 5185 deliberately omitted this authority. The Court reasoned that public officials possess powers, not rights, and in the absence of an express grant of authority, the Governor's act lacks validity. Citing Lacson v. Roque, the Court reiterated that laws relating to the suspension and removal of elective officials must be strictly construed because those elected must be allowed to serve their terms unless cause is proven through the specific procedure and by the specific officials entrusted with such responsibility. Furthermore, the Court observed that the Decentralization Act aims to provide local governments 'greater freedom,' and granting the suspension power to a collective body like the Provincial Board rather than a single individual acts as a safeguard against partisan political harassment. Therefore, since Section 5 grants the power of investigation to the Provincial Board, the Governor's unilateral order of suspension was void.
Main Doctrine
Under Section 5 of the Decentralization Act of 1967 (Republic Act No. 5185), the power to order the preventive suspension of a municipal mayor against whom administrative charges have been filed is vested in the Provincial Board, not the Provincial Governor.