Fuente v. She
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Justina Santos had entered into contracts leasing a parcel of land to Wong Heng for 99 years with a 50-year option to purchase, which were later annulled by the Supreme Court in Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She for subverting the constitutional ban against alien landholding. Following this decision, the estate of Justina Santos, represented by Antonio de la Fuente, sought a writ of execution against the respondent, Lui She, who had been substituted for Wong Heng. Procedural History: The estate sent a demand letter to Lui She for payment of the principal and legal interest, as well as to vacate the premises by March 9, 1968. Lui She sent a payment of P3,120, which was accepted and applied as partial payment for July's rent. Subsequently, Lui She's counsel proposed a new monthly rental of P5,000, citing difficulties in terminating subleases and the condition of the premises. The estate responded, noting their original demand for P15,000, reduced to P9,000, and emphasizing that the money judgment was final and executory. The estate also stated that any proposals were tentative unless approved by the probate court. Lui She then paid P5,000 for August and subsequent months, which the estate accepted and applied as partial payment towards the P15,000 demanded monthly rental, until December 1968 when payments were refused. The estate filed a motion for an alias writ of execution on November 12, 1968, after the initial writ was returned unsatisfied. The respondent judge quashed this alias writ, holding that a new month-to-month lease contract had been impliedly entered into, necessitating new unlawful detainer cases for eviction. The Petition: The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge to issue the writ of execution, arguing that the judge acted arbitrarily in holding that a new lease contract was formed when the parties' minds never met on the rent amount. The respondent judge defended the order, challenging the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, which the Court dismissed.
Issue(s)
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain the petition for mandamus against a lower court judge. Whether the Supreme Court's decision annulling the lease contracts was novated by the parties' subsequent negotiations and partial payments, thereby creating a new lease contract. Whether the respondent judge acted arbitrarily in quashing the alias writ of execution.
Ruling
The petition for mandamus is granted. The respondent judge is commanded to issue a writ of execution in L-17587, conformably with the pronouncements of the Supreme Court. Costs are against the private respondent.
Ratio Decidendi
On the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Supreme Court affirmed its original and concurrent jurisdiction with Courts of First Instance over petitions for mandamus against lower courts, as provided in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, even after its amendment by Republic Act 5440. The Court clarified that an order denying execution is not appealable, as it would lead to endless litigation, thus making mandamus an appropriate remedy. On the alleged novation and new lease contract: The Court held that the annulled lease contract was void ab initio for being repugnant to the Constitution, and a void contract cannot be renewed or revived, even by implication (tacita reconduccion). The Court found no evidence of a new lease contract being celebrated. The negotiations over rent and the acceptance of partial payments by the estate were done with a reservation and applied towards the P15,000 demanded monthly rental, indicating a continued assertion of rights under the original judgment, not an agreement to a new lease. The respondent's claim that the parties had reached a new agreement was belied by the sheriff's return and the respondent's own explanation to the sheriff. On the arbitrary action of the respondent judge: The respondent judge disregarded the duty to execute the judgment by holding that a new lease contract was impliedly formed. The Court found that the parties' minds never met on the essential terms of a new lease, particularly the rental amount. The correspondence showed that what began as a threat to exact payment for illegal occupancy evolved into negotiations, but these did not culminate in a meeting of the minds sufficient to constitute a new contract. Therefore, the judge's refusal to execute the judgment was an arbitrary act.
Main Doctrine
A void contract cannot be renewed or revived, even by implication. Negotiations for a new lease, where the parties do not agree on the terms, do not constitute a new lease contract, and do not prevent the execution of a prior judgment annulling the void contract.