People v. Resuello
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: An information for estafa was filed against Rosendo Resuello, as President and General Manager of Security Credit and Acceptance Corporation, and other officers. The information alleged that they received P800.00 from Florentina G. Limpin for deposit, with the obligation to return it upon demand. Instead, they allegedly conspired, with intent to gain, deceit, grave abuse of confidence, and by means of deceit, to misappropriate and convert the P800.00 for their personal benefit, failing to return it despite repeated demands, to the prejudice of Florentina G. Limpin. Procedural History: Rosendo Resuello filed a motion to quash the information, arguing that the facts charged did not constitute an offense and that the liability was purely civil. The trial court sustained the motion and dismissed the case. The Provincial Fiscal appealed the dismissal order. The Appeal: The State, as appellant, filed its brief claiming the trial court erred in considering the transaction a simple loan, in concluding the relationship was creditor-debtor, in ruling the liability was only civil, and in quashing the information.
Issue(s)
Whether the order of dismissal of the information is appealable. Whether the accused-appellee is guilty of laches.
Ruling
The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. The appellant is required to file the necessary petition for review within ten (10) days from notice. The appellee is required to file his brief within the reglementary period from notice of the petition for review.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the order of dismissal of the information is appealable: The Court acknowledged that the appellee argued the order of dismissal was not appealable under Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 5440, and that the proper remedy should have been a petition for review on certiorari since only a question of law was involved. However, the Court adopted a policy of giving due course to appeals in similarly situated cases, provided that the steps for the perfection of the appeal were taken in due time. This policy aims to prevent a miscarriage of justice and allows for a review of the merits of the case. The Court, therefore, denied the motion to dismiss the appeal but required the appellant to file the necessary petition for review on certiorari. On Whether the accused-appellee is guilty of laches: The Court found the accused-appellee guilty of laches. The appellee, through counsel, received copies of the State's brief on April 23, 1969. His attorneys filed a motion for a first extension of time to file their brief on May 22, 1969, which was granted. Subsequently, on June 20, 1969, they filed a motion for a second extension, which was also granted. It was only on July 5, 1969, after these extensions and after the State had filed its brief, that the appellee filed his motion to dismiss the appeal. The Court considered these facts as indicative of undue delay and therefore found the appellee guilty of laches, which further supported the denial of his motion to dismiss.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court, in the interest of substantial justice, may give due course to an appeal even if the remedy pursued was technically incorrect, provided that the steps for its perfection were taken within the reglementary period. This approach allows the Court to review the merits of the case, often by requiring the appellant to file the appropriate petition for review on certiorari. The Court also emphasizes the principle of laches, cautioning against undue delays in the filing of motions and pleadings.