Velez v. Bacay
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute originated from a civil case filed by spouses Magin and Lucy Velez against Uldarico Bacay, seeking rescission of a deed of absolute sale for a house and lot. The trial court ruled in favor of the Velez spouses, rescinding the sale and ordering Bacay to make payments and restore possession of the property. 2. Procedural History: Bacay filed a notice of appeal and record on appeal, which the trial court disapproved as untimely. Subsequently, the trial court ordered execution of its judgment. Bacay then filed a petition for relief from the order denying his appeal and a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals, seeking to set aside the execution order and stay its enforcement. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction, which was later followed by an order directing the provincial sheriff to maintain Bacay's possession and requiring the Velez spouses to show cause for contempt. The Velez spouses' motion to disqualify a justice from the appellate court was not expressly resolved. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals issued an order for the arrest and confinement of the Velez spouses until they relinquished possession. 3. The Petition: The Velez spouses filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with the Supreme Court, challenging the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. They argued that the Court of Appeals acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in giving due course to Bacay's petition, questioned the failure to resolve their motion for disqualification, and contested the contempt order issued against them. The Supreme Court issued a restraining order and later a resolution for the release of the Velez spouses on bond.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in giving due course to Bacay's petition for certiorari and prohibition before it. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in failing to resolve the motion to disqualify Justice Edmundo S. Piccio before taking further action. Whether the petitioners were guilty of contempt of the Court of Appeals for disobeying the writ of preliminary injunction and the order of June 23, 1965.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition, except with respect to the order of contempt dated July 14, 1965, which was set aside. No pronouncement as to costs was made.
Ratio Decidendi
On the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals: The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction in giving due course to Bacay's petition for certiorari and prohibition. The issues raised by the petitioners, concerning the finality of the trial court's decision and the propriety of the execution order, were precisely the matters that should be litigated and resolved in the Court of Appeals in connection with the petition before it. The Supreme Court stated that it could not preempt the appellate court's authority and function by considering these issues in the present special civil action. To claim abuse of discretion in giving due course to the petition based on the finality of the trial court's decision or the availability of other remedies would be to beg the very questions at issue before the appellate court. Therefore, the Supreme Court refrained from ruling on these questions. On the disqualification of Justice Piccio: The Supreme Court found that the motion to disqualify Justice Edmundo S. Piccio was implicitly denied when he took further action in the case, such as issuing the order of arrest. The Court clarified that the reason adduced for disqualification, an indirect imputation of partiality or bias based on alleged private interviews, was not among the grounds enumerated in Paragraph 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. The Court emphasized that a judge cannot be disqualified by a litigant except upon the grounds provided by law. Furthermore, the issue of disqualification became moot as Justice Piccio had since passed away. On the contempt charge: The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were entitled to relief from the contempt order. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of Appeals was prohibitory, intended to stop the enforcement of the writ of execution. However, by the time the injunction was served, the execution had already been implemented, and the petitioners had already been placed in actual possession of the property by the city sheriff. Consequently, there was nothing left to enjoin or prohibit. The Court noted that no mandatory injunction was subsequently issued to revert the parties to their former positions. Regarding the order of June 23, 1965, the Court pointed out that it was addressed to the provincial sheriff, not directly to the petitioners. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court was not prepared to say that the petitioners' act of remaining in possession, where they had been placed by virtue of the trial court's writ of execution, constituted contempt of the Court of Appeals.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court set aside the contempt order against the petitioners, finding that their continued possession of the property, after execution had already been implemented and they had been placed in possession by the sheriff, did not constitute contempt of the Court of Appeals. The Court also clarified that a motion for disqualification of a justice, based on alleged private interviews, was not a valid ground under the Rules of Court.