Atlas Consolidated Mining v. Rubiso
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Claimant began employment on December 19, 1953 as laborer and cement mixer operator-helper and later became an air compressor operator; he was separated from service on December 7, 1956 because of pulmonary tuberculosis, which was diagnosed as far advanced by company physicians in August and September 1956. During employment claimant performed labor involving exposure to cement dust, work in the open, and night duty every fifteen days. Subsequent X-rays in 1961 showed regression of the disease to the minimal stage. Procedural History: Claimant filed a claim for compensation with the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. 6 on March 29, 1961. The Hearing Officer, Department of Labor, Regional Office No. 6 rendered a decision awarding compensation; Associate Commissioner Jose Sanchez affirmed; the Workmen's Compensation Commission en banc promulgated a decision on November 19, 1963 and denied reconsideration in its resolution en banc of January 9, 1964. Petitioner sought review by certiorari before the Supreme Court. The Petition: Petitioner contended that the claim was barred by laches and prescription and that there was no substantial evidence of causal connection between claimant's illness and his employment. Petitioner also argued non-compensability of the illness.
Issue(s)
Whether the defenses of laches and prescription may be raised for the first time on appeal to the Supreme Court. Whether petitioner's failure to submit the report required by Section 37 of the Workmen's Compensation Act constitutes a waiver of defenses to the compensation claim. Whether the claimant's illness was compensable, i.e., whether it was contracted or aggravated during the period of employment. Whether the Commission's factual findings should be disturbed for lack of substantial evidence.
Ruling
The appealed decision and resolution of the Workmen's Compensation Commission are affirmed. Treble costs are imposed against petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether laches and prescription may be raised for the first time on appeal: The Court held that the defenses of laches and prescription were raised for the first time on appeal and therefore cannot be entertained because they do not affect the jurisdiction of the Commission and were thus deemed waived. Applying Regalado vs. Visayan Shipping Company, Inc. and other precedents cited by the Court, the petitioner waived such defenses by failing to invoke them before the Hearing Officer and the Commission. The Court emphasized that a party who fails to raise a defense before the administrative tribunal that has jurisdiction over the subject matter waives that defense on appeal. The Court noted the settled rule that matters not raised before an inferior tribunal cannot be entertained on appeal where they do not go to jurisdiction. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to consider laches and prescription for the first time on certiorari. On Whether failure to submit the report under Section 37 constitutes waiver: The Court found that petitioner had knowledge of claimant's illness yet failed to submit the report required by Section 37 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and that this failure amounted to a waiver of defenses to the compensation claim. Citing Martha Lumber Mill Inc. v. Romana V. Lagradante and Manila Railroad Company v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, the Court explained that an employer's right to controvert a claim arises immediately upon the occurrence of the event but is contingent upon timely filing of the required report within the statutory periods; failure to do so precludes the employer from later contesting compensability. The Court further relied on National Development Company v. Workmen's Compensation Commission to underscore that the law "bars all defenses available to the employer, making no exception." The result is that defenses, including timeliness objections, are barred when the employer neglects the Section 37 reporting duty. On Whether the illness was compensable (contracted or aggravated during employment): The Court treated compensability as a question of fact that was resolved in the claimant's favor by the Commission. The Commission found evidence that claimant exhibited symptoms during employment and that the nature of his work exposed him to conditions (inhalation of cement dust, exposure to elements, cold night work) that could aggravate the disease. The Supreme Court affirmed those factual findings, emphasizing that the record supports a finding of contraction or aggravation during the employment period and that the employer's own X-rays showed advanced disease while claimant was still employed. Because these findings are within the province of the Commission as fact-finder, the Court refused to disturb them absent a showing that they were unsupported by evidence. The Court concluded that the appeal was frivolous in light of the substantial evidence supporting the Commission's determinations. On Whether the Commission's factual findings should be disturbed for lack of substantial evidence: The Court declined to disturb the Commission's findings, implicitly applying the substantial-evidence standard for reviewing factual determinations by administrative tribunals. The Court explained that the Commission's factual conclusions were supported by medical examinations, X-rays, and testimony regarding the working conditions and thus must stand. The petitioner failed to show that the findings were without any evidentiary basis, and the Supreme Court therefore affirmed the lower rulings.
Main Doctrine
Failure of employer to file the report required by Section 37 of the Workmen's Compensation Act constitutes a waiver of defenses to compensation claims; compensability and aggravation of illness during employment is a question of fact for the Commission.