Macke v. Rubert
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On December 14, 1904, Rubert and Guamis leased the upper part of the "Grand Hotel" to F. A. Bayer. On the same date, F. A. Bayer and his wife, Rebecca Bayer, borrowed P5,000 from Estella L. P. Macke, signing a promissory note. Rebecca Bayer died on August 25, 1905. On September 14, 1905, F. A. Bayer pledged all the furniture in the leased premises to Estella L. P. Macke to secure the P5,000 loan. W. N. Chandler took possession of the pledged property. On January 1, 1906, Rubert and Guamis leased the lower part of the "Grand Hotel" to Bayer. On January 30, 1906, Bayer borrowed P1,000 from Estella L. P. Macke, and on July 23, 1906, borrowed another P1,000. On July 23, 1906, Bayer and Estella L. P. Macke agreed that P6,500 was due, and Bayer pledged all the furniture and fixtures in the hotel to her. Chandler again took possession. On August 1, 1906, Bayer executed a bill of sale for all the property to Estella L. P. Macke for P6,500, and she took possession. She then leased the property back to Bayer for six months at P100 per month. In mid-September 1906, B. H. Macke, as representative of Bayer's creditors (including Rubert and Guamis), took possession of the hotel for about six weeks. On October 26, 1906, Rubert obtained a judgment for P2,250 in rent for July, August, September, and October 1906, and Bayer was ejected. The sheriff, under Rubert's direction, levied execution on the personal property. The plaintiffs (B. H. Macke, administrator of Rebecca Bayer's estate, and Estella L. P. Macke) brought an action of replevin. Procedural History: The court below rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendant appealed. The Petition: The defendant appealed the decision of the lower court.
Issue(s)
Whether the defendant has a lien upon the property in question for the amount of rent due him by virtue of Article 1922, paragraph 7, of the Civil Code. Whether Bayer was still the owner of the property when the execution was levied, or if other persons had acquired interests therein. Whether the debt represented by the defendant's judgment was a debt of Mrs. Bayer or the conjugal partnership.
Ruling
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
Ratio Decidendi
On the defendant's lien under Article 1922, paragraph 7, of the Civil Code: The Court held that Article 1922, paragraph 7, of the Civil Code, which grants preference to credits for rent on the personal property of the lessee existing on the leased estate, is not applicable when the debtor has sold the property and parted with his ownership therein. This principle was established in Peña vs. Mitchell. In the present case, the property in question had become the property of the plaintiff, Estella L. P. Macke, prior to the attachment by Rubert and Guamis. Therefore, the attachment was illegal as no lien existed under this provision. On Bayer's ownership and prior interests: The Court found that even if Estella L. P. Macke were only a pledgee, she would be entitled to priority under Article 1922, paragraph 2, in connection with Article 1926, paragraph 1, of the Civil Code, as pledges are valid and subsisting when the pledgee or a third person takes possession. The evidence showed that Bayer, the original owner, was never in possession of the property after September 14, 1905. Furthermore, even if Bayer only owned half the property, it would still show he was not the owner of at least one-half, thus invalidating the pledge of the whole by him alone. The contract of pledge and the subsequent bill of sale effectively transferred ownership and possession to Estella L. P. Macke before the execution levy. On the nature of the debt for rent: The Court determined that the debt represented by the defendant's judgment was not a debt of Mrs. Bayer nor the conjugal partnership. A portion of the debt arose from a lease contract entered into by Bayer after his wife's death. The remainder, though originating from a contract during the conjugal partnership, was for rent that accrued long after the dissolution of the partnership by Mrs. Bayer's death. The Court stated that for installments of rent accruing a year after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, neither the partnership nor the estate of the deceased spouse is liable, citing Wilder vs. Peabody. The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the partnership would be liable for damages from an immediate breach of the lease contract upon dissolution.
Main Doctrine
A pledgee or purchaser of personal property, who has taken actual possession thereof, has a right superior to a subsequent attachment for rent, especially when the rent accrued after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and the property was leased after the death of one of the spouses.