David v. Santos
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners Lino G. David and his co-petitioners were candidates in the November 12, 1963 local elections for mayor of Tarlac. Petitioner Lino David was proclaimed the victor. Respondent Jose Geronimo, a rival candidate, filed an election protest against petitioner Lino David in early January 1964. On January 25, 1964, respondent Geronimo also filed a criminal complaint with the Court of First Instance of Tarlac against petitioner Lino David and his co-petitioners for alleged violation of Section 49 of the Revised Election Code (unlawful expenditures), punishable under Sections 183 and 185 thereof, allegedly committed before the said elections. Procedural History: The respondent Court scheduled a preliminary investigation for February 5, 1964. Petitioners moved for postponement, which was denied. On February 12, 1964, petitioners orally moved for dismissal, later formalized in writing on March 7, 1964, arguing that respondent Geronimo was not an "offended party" and lacked legal authority to file the complaint. Respondent Court denied this motion on February 6, 1966, upholding Geronimo's personality and stating the investigation was to determine if a prima facie case existed. On February 26, 1966, petitioners again moved for dismissal, this time on the ground of prescription, asserting the two-year prescriptive period under Section 188 of the Revised Election Code had lapsed without a Fiscal's information being filed. Respondent Court ordered written arguments and continued receiving evidence. On March 23, 1966, it denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that the filing of the complaint on January 25, 1964, interrupted prescription and that its jurisdiction was exclusive and continuing under Section 187 of the Revised Election Code. The Court also cited delays in the preliminary investigation due to judicial transfers and docket congestion. After their motion for reconsideration was denied on April 12, 1966, petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. The Petition: Petitioners prayed for the annulment of the questioned orders and a declaration that the offense had prescribed.
Issue(s)
Whether the filing of a criminal complaint by a private complainant with the Court of First Instance for an election offense, which has exclusive jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation, interrupts the period of prescription. Whether Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, concerning the interruption of prescription, is applicable to violations of special laws like the Revised Election Code.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The offense imputed to the petitioners has not prescribed. The filing of the criminal complaint on January 25, 1964, interrupted the prescriptive period, and the proceedings are deemed to be continuing.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription and interruption by filing a complaint: The Court held that the filing of a criminal complaint for violation of the Revised Election Code with the Court of First Instance, which possesses exclusive original jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigations and try election offenses, effectively interrupts the period of prescription. This is in accordance with Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that the period of prescription is interrupted by the filing of a complaint or information. The Court clarified that this principle applies even if the court where the complaint is filed can only conduct a preliminary investigation and not try the case on its merits, as long as it is the proper court for initiating such proceedings. The filing of the complaint signifies the commencement of proceedings against the offender, and it would be unjust to deprive the injured party of vindication due to delays beyond their control. The Court explicitly overruled prior conflicting decisions, such as People vs. Coquia, and reaffirmed the doctrine established in People vs. Olarte (1967). On the applicability of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code to special laws: The Court ruled that Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code is supplementary to special laws, including the Revised Election Code, unless the special law expressly provides otherwise. Section 188 of the Revised Election Code does not contain any provision for the interruption of the prescriptive period, thus making Article 91 applicable. The Court reasoned that this supplementary application ensures that the State's right to prosecute is preserved, preventing offenders from evading punishment through protracted proceedings. Even if Section 2 of Act 3326 were to govern, it also provides for interruption of prescription when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person. The Court emphasized that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance over election offenses under Section 187 of the Revised Election Code further solidifies the interruption of prescription upon the filing of the complaint, as this court is empowered to conduct the preliminary investigation and potentially try the case on its merits.
Main Doctrine
The filing of a criminal complaint for violation of the Revised Election Code with the Court of First Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation thereof, interrupts the period of prescription of the offense. This interruption is governed by Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which is supplementary to special laws like the Election Code, unless the latter expressly provides otherwise.