Philippine National Bank v. Deloso
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: On January 25, 1951, a judgment was rendered ordering defendants Juan Deloso, Francisco Imperial, and Magno Jamito to jointly and severally pay the Philippine National Bank (PNB) P600.00 plus interest, attorney's fees, and costs. This judgment was not executed within five years of its finality. 2. Procedural History: The PNB filed an action to revive the judgment on June 28, 1960 (Civil Case No. 4953), which was dismissed on September 30, 1964, for lack of jurisdiction due to the amount involved, which fell under the original jurisdiction of the City Court of Naga per Republic Act No. 2613. Subsequently, on January 11, 1965, the PNB filed a similar action with the City Court of Naga. This action was dismissed on August 18, 1966, on the grounds that the ten-year prescriptive period had elapsed since the judgment became final. The PNB appealed this dismissal to the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, which also dismissed the appeal, finding that the judgment had become final and executory thirteen years, ten months, and fifteen days prior to the filing of the action in the City Court, thus barring it by prescription under Articles 1144 and 1152 of the Civil Code. 3. The Petition: The PNB, as plaintiff-appellant, has appealed directly to the Supreme Court, arguing that the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 4953 should be considered an extrajudicial demand that interrupted the prescriptive period under Article 1155 of the Civil Code. Alternatively, the PNB contends that the ten-year prescriptive period for revival actions only commences after the expiration of the five-year period for execution by motion, as provided in Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, and that Article 1150 of the Civil Code supports this interpretation.
Issue(s)
Whether the dismissed complaint in Civil Case No. 4953, filed for lack of jurisdiction, constitutes an extrajudicial demand that interrupts the prescriptive period for revival of judgment. Whether the ten-year prescriptive period for revival of judgment commences from the date of finality of the judgment or from the expiration of the five-year period for execution by motion.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal, holding that the action was barred by prescription. The Court ruled that the ten-year prescriptive period for revival of judgment begins from the date of finality of the judgment, and that an action dismissed for lack of jurisdiction does not interrupt prescription.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the dismissed complaint constitutes an extrajudicial demand: The Court held that the contention is unmeritorious. Citing Philippine National Bank vs. Osete and Philippine National Bank vs. Pacific Commission House, the Court reiterated that Article 1155 of the Civil Code, which enumerates instances that interrupt prescription (filing before the court, written extrajudicial demand, or written acknowledgment), refers to actions to collect debts not based on a judgment. An extrajudicial demand is not applicable to a judgment sought to be revived because the creditor's rights are already based on a judicial decree, and the proper remedy for enforcing a judgment is execution by writ or by an independent action for revival, not an extrajudicial demand. Furthermore, even under the Code of Civil Procedure, a distinction was made regarding the effect of acknowledgment between contract-based debts and those confirmed by judgment, with the renovating effect limited to the former. On the issue of when the ten-year prescriptive period commences: The Court ruled that the ten-year prescriptive period for an action to revive a judgment commences to run from the date of the finality of the judgment, not from the expiration of the five-year period within which the judgment may be executed by mere motion. This was squarely ruled upon in Gutierrez Hermanos vs. De la Riva, which held that Section 447 of the Code of Civil Procedure (similar to Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court) should be construed in relation to Section 43, No. 1 (similar to Article 1144 of the Civil Code). The Court reasoned that the right to enforce a judgment begins upon its finality, and the remedies available are execution by motion within five years, and revival by action thereafter, but still within the overall ten-year prescriptive period from finality. To hold otherwise would extend the prescriptive period to fifteen years, contrary to the clear intent of the law. This doctrine has been consistently adhered to by the Court in numerous subsequent cases.
Main Doctrine
The ten-year prescriptive period for an action to revive a judgment commences from the date of its finality, not from the expiration of the five-year period for execution by motion. An action dismissed for lack of jurisdiction does not interrupt the prescriptive period.