United States v. Dionisio
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On January 6, 1908, at 9 o'clock in the morning, the defendants entered a house in Binondo, Manila, through the principal door which was half open. The lower part of the house was occupied by a Chinaman, Lin Chio Liong, and the upper portion by Narcisa de los Santos. No opposition was made to their entry. They proceeded upstairs to Narcisa de los Santos' room, where they conversed with her for about two hours, inquiring about another woman and whether the Chinamen in the house smoked opium. Narcisa de los Santos invited them to sit down and suggested they wait for the Chinamen. The defendants identified themselves as secret service men seeking to search for opium. Narcisa de los Santos offered no opposition, and they searched other rooms, finding opium and a pipe. They questioned Narcisa de los Santos, took notes, and threatened to take everyone to jail. Lin Chio Liong, hearing the noise, came upstairs. The defendants demanded P50 from him, threatening jail and a P500 fine if he did not pay. Lin Chio Liong stated he had no money and attempted to escape, leading to a struggle where his clothes were torn and his watch broken. The police, alerted by the disturbance, entered and arrested the defendants and Lin Chio Liong. The defendants had sought employment as secret service agents but failed and were acting on their own initiative. Procedural History: The trial court convicted the defendants of allanamiento de morada and sentenced them to four years, nine months, and ten days of presidio correccional. The Petition: The defendants appealed their conviction.
Issue(s)
Whether the facts proven warrant a conviction for the crime of allanamiento de morada (forcible entry into the dwelling of another). Whether the entry into the house was made against the will of the occupants.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court, acquitting the defendants of the crime of allanamiento de morada. The costs of both instances were declared de oficio.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the facts proven warrant a conviction for allanamiento de morada: The Court held that the facts proven were insufficient to sustain a conviction for allanamiento de morada. While the facts might support charges of assault or attempted estafa or robbery, they did not meet the essential elements of forcible entry into a dwelling. The Court reiterated the principle that an essential element of allanamiento de morada is that the entry must be made without the consent or against the will of the occupant. The prosecution must affirmatively establish this fact. The Court cited United States vs. Pedro Dulfo and a Spanish Supreme Court decision of September 28, 1876, which defined 'against' in this context as 'negation, manifest opposition to the doing of something.' On the issue of whether the entry into the house was made against the will of the occupants: The Court found no proof of opposition from the owners of the house to the defendants' entry. On the contrary, the actions of Lin Chio Liong in allowing the defendants to enter and proceed upstairs without objection, and Narcisa de los Santos' conduct in engaging in amicable conversation, inviting them to sit, and not objecting to their presence, indicated at least implied permission. The Court distinguished the present case from United States vs. Clauck (where the door was kicked down) and United States vs. Arceo (where entry was for robbery and met with immediate resistance), noting that in those cases, the entry was clearly against the will of the occupants. The Court emphasized that facts arising after entry, such as the defendants' subsequent impersonation and demand for money, could not retroactively change the character of the initial entry, which was made with tacit or express consent. The Court also referenced a Spanish Supreme Court decision of February 12, 1895, and May 3, 1892, to reinforce the principle that while express prohibition is not always necessary, the opposition must be inferable from circumstances existing prior to or at the time of entry, not from events occurring thereafter.
Main Doctrine
The crime of allanamiento de morada (forcible entry into the dwelling house of another) requires that the entry must have been made against the will of the occupant. Mere entry into a house, even if later accompanied by improper conduct or criminal acts, does not constitute allanamiento de morada if the initial entry was with the express or tacit consent of the occupant. Facts arising after the entry cannot change the character of the entry from one with assent to one contrary thereto.