Kay Villegas Kami, Inc. v. Commission on Elections
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner, Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., a non-stock and non-profit corporation, filed a petition for declaratory relief seeking a determination of the validity of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6132 and its rights and duties thereunder. Procedural History: Not applicable as this is the original petition filed before the Supreme Court. The Petition: Petitioner averred that it had printed materials designed to propagate its ideology and program of government and intended to support delegates to the Constitutional Convention who would propagate its ideology. Petitioner specifically impugned the first paragraph of Section 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, alleging it violates the due process clause, right of association, freedom of expression, and constitutes an ex post facto law.
Issue(s)
Whether Section 8(a) of Republic Act No. 6132 is unconstitutional for violating the due process clause, right of association, and freedom of expression. Whether Section 8(a) of Republic Act No. 6132 constitutes an ex post facto law.
Ruling
The petition is denied, and paragraph 1 of Section 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is declared not unconstitutional. No costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On the alleged violation of due process, right of association, and freedom of expression: The Court held that the grounds raised by the petitioner were previously overruled in the cases of Imbong vs. Comelec and Gonzales vs. Comelec. The questioned provision was deemed a valid limitation on the due process, freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, and equal protection clauses. This limitation is justified as it is designed to prevent the clear and present danger of the prostitution of the electoral process and the denial of equal protection of the laws. Furthermore, under the balancing-of-interests test, the Court found that the cleansing of the electoral process, the guarantee of equal opportunity for all candidates, and the independence of the delegates are interests that should be accorded primacy. Therefore, petitioner is bound by the pronouncements in the aforementioned cases. On the claim that Section 8(a) constitutes an ex post facto law: The Court found this claim untenable. An ex post facto law is defined as one that makes an act criminal which was innocent when done, aggravates a crime, changes the punishment to a greater one, alters legal rules of evidence to authorize conviction on less testimony, imposes a penalty for acts lawful when done, or deprives an accused of lawful protection. The constitutional inhibition against ex post facto laws refers only to criminal laws given retroactive effect. While Section 18 of R.A. No. 6132 penalizes violations of its provisions, including Section 8(a), the penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the approval of the law. There is no indication that Sections 8(a) and 18, or any other provision, apply to acts performed prior to its approval. On the contrary, Section 23 explicitly states that the entire law shall be effective upon its approval on August 24, 1970. Thus, the challenged provision does not have retroactive application to acts committed before its enactment.
Main Doctrine
Section 8(a) of Republic Act No. 6132, which imposes limitations on the rights of association, expression, and assembly in relation to the Constitutional Convention, is a valid exercise of legislative power designed to prevent the clear and present danger of the prostitution of the electoral process and the denial of equal protection of the laws. The said provision does not constitute an ex post facto law as it only penalizes acts committed after its approval.