De Jesus v. Domingo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Trinidad D. Fernandez instituted a case against Conrado C. de Jesus (De Jesus) to recover P3,000 based on a promissory note executed by De Jesus. De Jesus alleged he signed the note for accommodation and filed a counterclaim. The City Court rendered judgment sentencing De Jesus to pay Mrs. Fernandez and dismissing his counterclaim. De Jesus appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI). Procedural History: The CFI set the case for pre-trial. Due to absences and leaves of absence of the judge, the pre-trial was reset multiple times. On July 17, 1968, neither De Jesus nor his counsel appeared, leading to the dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute. A motion for reconsideration was denied. The record was remanded to the City Court, which issued a writ of execution. De Jesus moved to lift the writ, alleging lack of notice of the denial of his reconsideration motion. The City Court initially ordered a hold in abeyance but later set aside the order. De Jesus then filed a motion to lift the levy on personal properties, claiming they belonged exclusively to his wife and were not liable for his debts. He also filed a third-party claim. Subsequently, De Jesus filed a petition for relief in the CFI based on fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, and a motion for a restraining order. Judge Domingo issued a restraining order but later dismissed the petition for relief and lifted the restraining order, holding that an order for execution is not a 'judgment' under Rule 38 and that notice of the denial of reconsideration was sent by registered mail but unclaimed. The Petition: The spouses Conrado C. de Jesus and Emilia Estrella de Jesus filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the CFI order dismissing their petition for relief and the writ of execution and levy made by the City Court Sheriff.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of First Instance (CFI) erred in dismissing the petition for relief filed by De Jesus. Whether the orders of execution and lifting of the restraining order by the City Court are considered 'judgments' within the meaning of Section 1 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. Whether the dismissal of the appeal by the CFI for failure to prosecute was valid, considering alleged insufficient notice of pre-trial and proof of service. Whether the City Court acquired jurisdiction over the case given the alleged insufficient proof of service of orders. Whether the respondents should be held in contempt of court.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed, and the writs prayed for are denied. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Supreme Court is set aside, and the motion for contempt is likewise denied.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of certiorari and prohibition to annul the CFI's dismissal of the petition for relief: The Court held that an order denying a petition for relief is appealable under Section 2 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, it cannot be corrected through a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. The dismissal of the petition for relief by Judge Domingo was an appealable order, not a void judgment that could be assailed via certiorari. On whether orders of execution and lifting of restraining orders are 'judgments' under Section 1 of Rule 38: The Court clarified the distinction between Section 1 and Section 2 of Rule 38. Section 1 applies to judgments rendered by an inferior court where a party has been deprived of a hearing or prevented from appealing. Section 2 applies to any judgment, order, or proceeding taken against a party in a Court of First Instance. The orders of execution and lifting of the restraining order by the City Court were not 'judgments' within the contemplation of Section 1 of Rule 38. Furthermore, the petitioners were not deprived of a hearing or prevented from appealing in relation to these specific orders. On the validity of the dismissal of the appeal for failure to prosecute: The Court found the petitioners' pretenses regarding insufficient notice of pre-trial and proof of service to be untenable. Since no appeal was taken from the order dismissing the appeal, it became final and executory. The dismissal of the appeal and the subsequent remand of the record to the City Court for execution were valid consequences. On the City Court's jurisdiction: Given that the appeal was validly dismissed and the record remanded, the inferior court had the authority to proceed with the enforcement of its decision. The alleged insufficiency of proof of service of earlier orders did not divest the inferior court of jurisdiction in light of the subsequent final and executory dismissal of the appeal. On the motion for contempt: The Court denied the motion for contempt. It found that the acts imputed to Mr. and Mrs. Fernandez and Sheriff Cardenas were committed prior to their notification of the Supreme Court's injunction. It was not sufficiently shown that the City Judge's order was ante-dated, and the notice of levy was filed before the injunction. Crucially, the persons charged with contempt desisted from enforcing the writ of execution upon notice of the injunction.
Main Doctrine
An order denying a petition for relief is appealable, and thus, cannot be corrected through a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. Furthermore, orders of execution issued by an inferior court, and orders lifting a restraining order on such execution, are not 'judgments' within the contemplation of Section 1 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, which pertains to relief from judgments of inferior courts.