Wylengco v. Cabigting
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute arose from a confrontation between Jesus Wylengco and Epifania Guezon Vda. de Cabigting. Following a typhoon that caused bamboo trees on Wylengco's property to lean onto Cabigting's lot and damage her fence, Cabigting obtained permission to cut the trees. After she cut them but left the trunks, Wylengco allegedly uttered defamatory remarks in the Pampango dialect towards Cabigting in the presence of others, including her daughters. This incident led to a complaint for serious oral defamation being filed against Wylengco. 2. Procedural History: Epifania Guezon Vda. de Cabigting filed a complaint for serious oral defamation (I.S. No. 693) against Jesus Wylengco with the City Fiscal's Office of Angeles City on July 24, 1964. During the preliminary investigation, Wylengco's counsel moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the defamatory statements, uttered in the heat of anger, constituted only slight oral defamation and had prescribed due to the lapse of two months without an information being filed. Special Counsel Erlinda Cristobal Viray denied this motion and a subsequent motion for reconsideration. Wylengco then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a writ of preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to stop the preliminary investigation. The trial court initially issued the injunction but later dismissed the petition and dissolved the injunction. 3. The Petition: Jesus Wylengco, as petitioner-appellant, appealed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to the Supreme Court. The appeal questioned whether Special Counsel Erlinda C. Viray committed a grave abuse of discretion or acted in excess of her jurisdiction by denying his motion to dismiss the preliminary investigation and directing it to proceed. Wylengco contended that the alleged defamatory remarks, if made, were uttered in the heat of anger and thus constituted slight oral defamation, which had prescribed. The Supreme Court, however, affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the Special Counsel's action was within her discretion and did not constitute grave abuse of discretion, as she had not yet made a definitive ruling on the merits or prescription, preferring to hear evidence.
Issue(s)
Whether the Special Counsel acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss the preliminary investigation. Whether the defamatory remarks constituted serious oral defamation or slight oral defamation. Whether the crime of slight oral defamation had prescribed.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance, dismissing the petition and assessing treble costs against the appellant for delaying the final disposition of the case.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion: The Court held that the Special Counsel's denial of the motion to dismiss, without a definitive ruling on prescription but instead directing the presentation of evidence, did not constitute grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction. The investigating counsel's action was within her discretion to fully appreciate the facts of the case, especially since the grounds for dismissal were not indubitable. The Court noted that the doctrine regarding defamatory words uttered in the heat of anger constituting only slight defamation would not apply without evidence of provocation. On the issue of the nature of the defamation and prescription: The Court clarified that the merits of the criminal charge, including whether the statements constituted serious or slight oral defamation and whether the case had prescribed, were not the issues before the CFI in the certiorari and prohibition case. The sole issue was the alleged grave abuse of discretion by the Special Counsel. The Court emphasized that Wylengco was not deprived of his right to raise the defense of prescription at the trial proper after the case was elevated to the court. On the procedural aspect of the appeal: The Court found that the appeal merely served to delay the final disposition of the case, warranting the assessment of treble costs against the appellant.
Main Doctrine
A Special Counsel's denial of a motion to dismiss a preliminary investigation, without a clear ruling on the issue of prescription but instead directing the presentation of evidence, does not constitute grave abuse of discretion if the grounds for dismissal are not indubitable and the investigating counsel wishes to fully appreciate the facts of the case. The defense of prescription can still be raised during the trial proper.