Pacete v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Felizardo S. Pacete was appointed Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato by the President on August 31, 1964. He assumed office on September 11, 1964. His ad interim appointment was submitted to the Commission on Appointments (CA) during its 1965 session and was unanimously confirmed on May 20, 1965. On February 7, 1966, the Secretary of Justice advised petitioner to vacate his position, stating his appointment was by-passed. Petitioner learned that on May 21, 1965, a member of the CA filed a letter stating his intention to file a motion for reconsideration of the confirmation due to derogatory information. The Secretary of the CA considered this as automatically vacating the confirmation, leading to the Secretary of Justice's directive. Procedural History: Petitioner filed a suit for mandamus and prohibition with the Supreme Court on April 4, 1966, seeking to compel the issuance of a certificate of confirmation and to prohibit the enforcement of the directive to vacate his position. Respondents, the Secretary of the CA and the Secretary of Justice, sought dismissal, arguing the filing of the motion for reconsideration recalled the confirmation and that the matter was internal to the CA and beyond judicial inquiry. The Secretary of Justice argued he gave credence to the CA Secretary's notification. The Petition: Petitioner contended that the letter of Senator Guanzon, even if treated as a motion for reconsideration, was without force and effect as it was not approved by the CA as a body. He argued that the confirmation became final and executory upon the adjournment of the fifth Congress's fourth regular session on May 21, 1965. He asserted that the power to approve or disapprove appointments rests with the Commission as a body, not individual members, and a mere motion to reconsider, without approval by the required majority, has no legal effect.
Issue(s)
Whether the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a confirmed ad interim appointment, without its being acted upon by the Commission on Appointments, is sufficient to set aside the confirmation. Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the internal rules and actions of the Commission on Appointments when such actions affect an individual's right to public office.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. It held that the confirmation of petitioner's ad interim appointment stands and is given full force and effect. The Court commanded the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments to issue the certificate of confirmation and prohibited the Secretary of Justice from enforcing the directive to vacate the position.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the effect of a motion for reconsideration: The Court reiterated its ruling in Altarejos v. Molo (L-25726, October 21, 1968, 25 SCRA 550) that the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration of a confirmed ad interim appointment does not automatically set aside the confirmation. Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments requires that if a majority of the members present concur to grant a reconsideration, the appointment shall be reopened. Without such approval, the motion for reconsideration has no force and effect. The confirmation, having been unanimously made and not having been disapproved or reconsidered by the required majority, remains valid and effective. The Court emphasized that an ad interim appointment is effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; a unanimous confirmation, followed by a mere unacted motion for reconsideration, does not constitute disapproval. On the issue of judicial jurisdiction: The Court rejected the argument that the matter was beyond judicial inquiry, stating that it would extend the political question doctrine beyond its legitimate limits. The courts have the power to ensure that private rights are not invaded, and even legislative acts and executive orders are subject to judicial scrutiny. The Court held that a rule of the Commission on Appointments, especially when its construction would defeat an individual's right to public office, can be inquired into. The Court stressed that while utmost deference should be paid to the Commission's interpretation, the fundamental law (the Constitution) must prevail, particularly when claims arising from its express language are pressed upon the judiciary. The Court noted that the Secretary of Justice's memorandum implicitly acknowledged this by stating that judicial supervision is possible upon a clear showing of arbitrary and improvident use of powers constituting a denial of due process.
Main Doctrine
A duly confirmed ad interim appointment is not nullified by the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration without its being voted upon and approved by the Commission on Appointments. The confirmation stands unless disapproved by the Commission or until the next adjournment of Congress.