Fernando v. Franco
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On January 11, 1958, a passenger truck owned by defendant-appellant Anastacio Franco, driven by his employee Leonardo Cabaron, ran over and killed a child, Nonito Andres. Procedural History: On May 23, 1958, Leonardo Cabaron was charged with homicide through reckless imprudence. He was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, and this conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in September 1962. The heirs of the deceased (plaintiffs-appellees) filed a civil action against Anastacio Franco on December 12, 1963, seeking indemnity for damages, moral damages, attorney's fees, and exemplary damages. The Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte rendered a judgment on October 5, 1965, ordering Franco to pay the P6,000.00 indemnity awarded in the criminal case. The Petition: Defendant-appellant Anastacio Franco appealed the decision, raising solely the issue of prescription, arguing that the civil action was filed more than five years after the accident.
Issue(s)
Whether the civil action filed by the plaintiffs-appellees against the defendant-appellant for subsidiary liability has prescribed. Whether the prescriptive period for the civil action against the employer begins from the date of the accident or from the finality of the criminal conviction of the employee.
Ruling
The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, holding that the civil action had not prescribed and that defendant-appellant Anastacio Franco is subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether the civil action filed by the plaintiffs-appellees against the defendant-appellant for subsidiary liability has prescribed: The Court held that the civil action had not prescribed. The employer's subsidiary liability arises only after a judgment of conviction against the employee has become final. In this case, the criminal conviction of the driver, Leonardo Cabaron, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in September 1962. The civil action was filed on December 12, 1963, which is less than a year after the finality of the conviction. Therefore, the action was timely filed. The defense of prescription is devoid of any support in law, as the claim against the employer only legally accrued upon the finality of the judgment against the employee. On whether the prescriptive period for the civil action against the employer begins from the date of the accident or from the finality of the criminal conviction of the employee: The Court clarified that the prescriptive period for the civil action against the employer for subsidiary liability does not begin from the date of the accident. Instead, it commences from the date the judgment of conviction against the employee becomes final and executory. This is because the employer's liability is contingent upon the conviction of the employee. Citing Martinez v. Barredo, the Court reiterated that the employer's liability is a consequence of the employee's conviction. Therefore, the assertion that the civil action filed on December 12, 1963, scarcely a year after the right against the employer had accrued, cannot be considered as having prescribed. The lower court's decision that there is no legal bar to holding the defendant-appellant subsidiarily liable is thus reinforced.
Main Doctrine
An employer is subsidiarily liable for damages awarded in a judgment of conviction for homicide through reckless imprudence against their employee, and this liability accrues from the finality of the conviction. The prescriptive period for filing a civil action against the employer for such damages begins from the date of finality of the criminal conviction, not from the date of the accident.