Flores-Reyes v. Zamora
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The plaintiff alleged that she was the lessee of the land described in the complaint and that she had subleased a portion to the defendants on a month-to-month basis. The complaint alleged that despite repeated demands made since October 1965, the defendants refused to vacate the premises. The plaintiff's letter of demand, Exhibit B, was dated January 24, 1966, and the registry return card, Exhibit B-2, indicated receipt by the defendants on February 3, 1966. The complaint was filed on February 28, Procedural History: The City Court of Manila rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila (trial court), which dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had not complied with Section 2 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court because the letter of demand had given five days instead of fifteen. The Appeal: The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court, which took the case en banc. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance, holding that Section 2 of Rule 70 had been complied with. The Court found that the demand was made at least fifteen days before the filing of the action, as the complaint was filed twenty-five days after the defendants received the letter of demand. The Court sentenced the defendants to vacate the premises and to pay P200 as attorney's fees.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of First Instance erred in dismissing the complaint for noncompliance with Section 2 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for, including possession of the premises and attorney's fees.
Ruling
The judgment of the Court of First Instance is reversed. Judgment is entered sentencing the defendants to vacate the premises in question and to pay the plaintiff the sum of two hundred pesos (P200) as attorney's fees, in addition to costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the Court of First Instance erred in dismissing the complaint for noncompliance with Section 2 of Rule 70: The Court explained that Section 2 of Rule 70 requires that the demand be made at least fifteen (15) days before bringing the action, and that this period refers to the time that should elapse from the making of the demand to the filing of the action, not the period to be given in the letter of demand. The Court noted the plaintiff's Exhibit B was dated January 24, 1966 and that the registry return card, Exhibit B-2, showed that the defendants received the demand on February 3, 1966. Because the complaint was filed on February 28, 1966, twenty-five days had elapsed between receipt of the demand and filing of the complaint, satisfying the fifteen-day requirement of Section 2. The Court therefore concluded that the Court of First Instance misapplied Section 2 by focusing on the five-day period stated in the letter rather than the statutory fifteen-day period measured from demand to filing. Applying the governing interpretation of Section 2, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's dismissal. On Whether the plaintiff is entitled to possession and attorney's fees: The Court accepted the factual findings favorable to the plaintiff as reflected in the City Court's decision and found no valid procedural bar to the prosecution of the unlawful detainer action because the statutory demand requirement was met. Having so concluded, the Court determined that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief sought and thus directed that the defendants be ordered to vacate the premises. The Supreme Court also awarded attorney's fees in the amount of P200 and costs, including this disposition in the dispositive portion of the judgment. The Court's disposition corrected the trial court's procedural dismissal and restored the City Court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff, subject to the specific relief ordered by the Supreme Court.
Main Doctrine
Section 2 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires that the demand be made at least fifteen (15) days before bringing an action; the period refers to the time that should transpire from the demand to the date of filing of the action, not the period to be given in the letter of demand.