Director of Lands v. Raymundo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Mariano B. Raymundo filed an application for registration of imperfect or incomplete title over five parcels of land in Mabitac, Laguna, alleging acquisition through occupation since time immemorial. The application was amended. Procedural History: The Director of Lands and oppositors Adriano Carpio, Martin Aguilar, and Pedro Aguilar opposed the application. The trial court declared Raymundo as having proprietary rights over certain lots and a portion of another, while the oppositors proved title to the northern portion of Lot No. 463. Both Raymundo and the Director of Lands appealed. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment, recognizing Raymundo's title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463, based on an unsigned copy of a deed of sale (Exhibit "E-1") and another deed (Exhibit "O"), the original of which was allegedly lost. The Court of Appeals admitted Exhibit "O" despite being an unsigned copy, citing Raymundo's explanation that the original was entrusted to his lawyer, Mariano C. Melendres, and was subsequently lost or destroyed during World War II. Raymundo's testimony was corroborated by Melendres, and a receipt for a down payment (Exhibit "O-1") was also presented. The Petition: The Director of Lands and the oppositors Carpio and Aguilar brothers petitioned the Supreme Court, questioning the Court of Appeals' ruling regarding the northern portion of Lot No. 463, particularly the admission of an unsigned copy of a deed of sale as secondary evidence, alleging it contravened the Rules of Court.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in admitting an unsigned copy of a deed of sale as secondary evidence to prove the due execution and contents of the original document. Whether Raymundo established his title and ownership over the northern portion of Lot No. 463.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals concerning the northern portion of Lot No. 463, declaring it part of the public domain, subject to the possessory rights of the oppositors Carpio and Aguilar brothers. The Court affirmed Raymundo's title over the other lots as determined by the trial court.
Ratio Decidendi
On the admissibility of secondary evidence for the unsigned deed of sale: The Court held that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in admitting the unsigned copy of the deed of sale (Exhibit "O") as secondary evidence. Section 51 of the old Rule 123 (now Section 4, Revised Rules of Court) requires proof of the due execution and subsequent loss or destruction of the original instrument before secondary evidence can be admitted. The testimony of Judge Mariano C. Melendres, while stating that the original deed was entrusted to him and later lost, did not establish that he witnessed the execution of the deed by Mariano Castro, nor did he recognize the signatures thereon. His testimony merely indicated that the document, perhaps already accomplished, was delivered to him. The Court emphasized that proof of due execution requires testimony from the parties who executed it, the person before whom it was acknowledged, or witnesses who saw its execution and delivery, or who recognized the signatures. The receipt (Exhibit "O-1") acknowledging a down payment did not prove the due execution of the deed of sale itself. Therefore, the basis for admitting secondary evidence was not sufficiently established. On whether Raymundo established title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463: Since the Court found that the secondary evidence for the deed of sale was improperly admitted, Raymundo failed to establish his right or title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463. The Court reiterated that when an applicant fails to establish their right or title to a property, and there is no showing that it was acquired from the Government by purchase or grant, the property remains part of the public domain. Consequently, the northern portion of Lot No. 463 was declared part of the public domain.
Main Doctrine
The due execution and subsequent loss of an original instrument evidencing a transaction in realty must be proven before secondary evidence of its contents may be admitted. Proof of due execution requires testimony from those who executed it, before whom it was acknowledged, or those who witnessed its execution and delivery, or recognized the signatures.