Borden v. Hontanosas
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Ramon Torralba filed an ejectment with damages case against spouses Maurecio and Adela de Borden in the City Court of Cebu, alleging that the defendants deprived him of possession of approximately 300 square meters of his lot through stealth, strategy, threat, and intimidation since 1952, and refused to vacate despite demands. Procedural History: The defendants admitted occupancy but claimed to have paid rentals from 1953. They raised lack of jurisdiction as an affirmative defense, arguing the illegal entry occurred more than 12 months prior to the filing of the case. The City Court denied their motion to dismiss, deeming the case more of unlawful detainer than forcible entry, and counted the one-year period from the date of demand. After the defendants failed to appear for trial, the City Court rendered judgment ordering them to vacate and pay rentals. The defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI). The Petition: In the CFI, the plaintiff applied for immediate execution of the judgment due to the defendants' failure to file a supersedeas bond and deposit rentals. The CFI granted the execution. The defendants opposed this, praying for a preliminary injunction to restrain the execution, citing lack of jurisdiction, nullity of judgment for lack of due process, and fraud. The CFI denied their motion. The defendants filed several motions for reconsideration and dismissal, all denied by the CFI. Subsequently, the plaintiff moved for a special demolition order. Before this could be issued, the defendants filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court, seeking to annul the CFI proceedings and orders, alleging the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. A temporary restraining order was issued by the Supreme Court.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in granting the motion for immediate execution of the City Court's decision. Whether the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in denying the defendants' motions for a preliminary injunction to enjoin execution and for the outright dismissal of the case. Whether the City Court lacked jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed, and the restraining order is dissolved, subject to the condition that no order of demolition shall be issued until the jurisdiction of the City Court is affirmed. Costs are against the petitioners.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of jurisdiction and the denial of the motion to dismiss: The petitioners' insistence on the dismissal of the appealed case due to alleged lack of jurisdiction of the City Court, based on the filing of the case beyond one year from disposition, cannot be sustained. The City Court made findings that the defendants had been paying rentals from 1953 to 1966 and that the plaintiff had made demands to vacate, both verbally and in writing. Therefore, whether there was a proper demand or whether the case was instituted within the one-year period, computed from the date of the last demand, is a matter of evidence. The respondent judge, in the exercise of discretion, deferred action on the jurisdictional issue until after evidence has been received, which is allowed by Section 3 of Revised Rule 16. This action does not constitute grave abuse of discretion. On the issue of immediate execution and the denial of the injunction: The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the issuance of the disputed orders by the respondent judge. The Court noted that if there was any error, it was in the judge's patience with the petitioners by acting on their various pleadings and holding off immediate execution, notwithstanding the explicit provisions of Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court. This rule authorizes immediate execution of judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case, even if appealed, if the defendant fails to file a supersedeas bond and deposit the monthly rentals. The petitioners failed to comply with both requirements, making it mandatory for the lower court to order immediate execution. The Court reiterated that the function of the court in executing the judgment becomes ministerial and imperative upon such failure, even with delayed payment of rentals, unless excused by mistake, accident, or fraud. On the procedural aspect of raising jurisdiction: The Court acknowledged that if the City Court actually lacked jurisdiction, the defendants would not be obligated to file a supersedeas bond or deposit rentals. However, by choosing to raise the issue of jurisdiction via an appeal from the judgment to vacate, instead of through a writ of certiorari from the order denying their motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioners, as appellants, are bound by Rule 70 governing appeals from ejectment judgments. The Court also found no substantial prejudice to the appellants in the application of Section 8 of Rule 70, as posting a supersedeas bond or depositing rentals does not constitute deprivation of property or rights. Allowing a party to evade these rules by raising an unmeritorious jurisdictional issue on appeal would prejudice the winning party.
Main Doctrine
A respondent judge does not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying a motion to dismiss a case on jurisdictional grounds when the issue of jurisdiction is intertwined with the merits of the case and requires reception of evidence. Furthermore, the failure of a defendant to file a supersedeas bond and deposit the required rentals pending appeal in an ejectment case mandates the immediate execution of the judgment, making the court's action in ordering such execution ministerial.