Jurado v. Suy Yan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Suy Yan and his co-accused Chao Ce were charged with estafa in the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte. The information alleged that they, representing Davao Good Hope Marketing, defrauded Jose Dy Pico, Manager of Dy Pico Sons, by falsely pretending to have sufficient funds to pay for 25,000 bags of cement purchased at P120,500.00. They issued checks for payment, one of which, TCBT Check No. 65339 for P20,000.00, was dishonored due to insufficient funds. The information stated the offense was contrary to Article 315, paragraphs 2(a) and 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. Procedural History: Respondent Suy Yan filed a motion to quash the information, alleging it charged more than one offense (estafa under par. 2(a) and par. 2(d)). The respondent fiscal argued it charged only one offense of estafa, with the paragraphs merely describing the means employed. The trial court denied the motion to quash and a subsequent motion for reconsideration. Respondent Suy Yan then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals. The Petition: The Court of Appeals, in a resolution penned by Justice Villamor, directed the fiscal to elect and amend the information to charge only one offense. The City Fiscal of Iligan City filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion.
Issue(s)
Whether the information charging estafa under Article 315, paragraphs 2(a) and 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, is defective for duplicity of offenses. Whether a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus is the proper remedy after a motion to quash is denied.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the resolution of the Court of Appeals and directed the trial court to proceed with the arraignment and trial of the case. The Court held that the information did not charge two offenses but a single offense of estafa committed through multiple deceitful acts, which are merely descriptive of the means employed to perpetrate the crime.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of duplicity of offenses: The Supreme Court reiterated the principle that an information is not defective for duplicity when a single crime is set forth in different modes prescribed by law for its commission, or when several acts are related and describe the offense. In this case, the allegations under paragraphs 2(a) and 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code were considered as merely specifying two of the various modes of committing estafa through deceit, which were employed by the accused in a single transaction with the same offended party. The two fraudulent acts were part of only one single criminal impulse, and the information adequately informed the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, allowing him to prepare his defense. The Court emphasized that the allegations were clear and did not deceive the accused regarding the single offense of estafa charged. On the propriety of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus: The Supreme Court reaffirmed its consistent ruling that neither certiorari nor prohibition lies against an order denying a motion to quash because such an order is interlocutory and not appealable. The accused, after the denial of the motion to quash, must proceed to trial without prejudice to reiterating his defenses, and if an adverse decision is rendered, his remedy is to appeal. While acknowledging that the rule is not always "hard and fast" as per Lopez v. Paras, the Court found that the instant case did not fall under the exceptions where certiorari would be proper, as there was no dispute regarding the territorial jurisdiction of the court over the offense charged, unlike in Lopez v. Paras where the offense was outside the court's jurisdiction. The Court distinguished the present case from Esguerra v. People, noting that in Esguerra, there was ambiguity in the information and an assurance from the fiscal that was later contradicted, leading to a conviction under a different offense than what was understood during trial. In this case, the information was deemed clear and the fiscal's stance consistent.
Main Doctrine
An information charging estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is not defective for duplicity when it alleges the commission of the offense through multiple deceitful acts or false pretenses, provided these acts constitute different modes of committing the same single offense and are part of one transaction or single criminal impulse.