Daisug v. Sacay
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute involves a civil case for the recovery of possession and partition of several parcels of land, along with damages. The Court of First Instance of Leyte rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (private respondents) and against the defendant (petitioner) on November 18, 1965. The petitioner's subsequent motion to set aside the judgment and grant a new trial was denied by the trial court on December 28, 1965. 2. Procedural History: The petitioner appealed the denial of his motion to the Court of Appeals, where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 37318-R. During the pendency of the appeal, the petitioner's counsel withdrew due to his appointment as a judge. The Court of Appeals granted a 45-day extension for the petitioner to secure new counsel and file his brief. A new counsel entered an appearance and subsequently filed a motion for a 40-day extension to file the appellant's brief. The Court of Appeals granted a first extension of only 30 days from July 2, 1969. Four days after this period expired, the new counsel filed a motion for a second extension. The Court of Appeals denied this motion and dismissed the appeal on September 16, 1969, for failure to file the brief within the granted period. 3. The Petition: The petitioner seeks review of the Court of Appeals' resolution dismissing his appeal. The petition argues that the appellate court erred in dismissing the appeal because a second motion for extension was mailed before the petitioner received the resolution granting only a 30-day extension instead of the requested 40 days. It also contends that the appeal should not have been dismissed as the brief was filed before the order of dismissal was issued. Finally, the petitioner asserts that his evidence is strong and the trial court's decision would likely be reversed if the appeal were given due course. The petition is brought before this Court via certiorari.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioner's appeal for filing a motion for extension of time after the expiration of the extended period. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not giving due course to the appeal despite the filing of the brief before the order of dismissal. Whether petitioner's evidence is strong enough to warrant reversal or remand of the case.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The resolution of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of dismissal of appeal for late filing of motion for extension: The Court held that pursuant to Section 15 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, extensions of time for the filing of briefs are not allowed except for good and sufficient cause, and only if the motion for extension is filed before the expiration of the time sought to be extended. In this case, the motion for a second extension was filed on August 5, 1969, four days after the expiration of the 30-day extension granted by the Court of Appeals, which ended on August 1, 1969. The Court reiterated the principle that parties should not assume that their motions for extension will be granted, as such grants are matters of sound judicial discretion and not a matter of right. The Court emphasized that parties who disregard these pronouncements must suffer the consequences of their indifference. On the issue of giving due course to the appeal despite filing the brief later: The Court found no merit in the argument that the appeal should be given due course because the brief was filed on September 8, 1969, and the order of dismissal was issued on September 16, 1969. The dismissal was based on the procedural lapse of filing the motion for extension out of time, which is a ground for dismissal under the Rules of Court. The subsequent filing of the brief did not cure the defect of the untimely motion for extension. The Court's adherence to the strict application of procedural rules, particularly concerning the timely filing of pleadings and motions, is a well-established principle to ensure the orderly administration of justice and prevent undue delays. On the issue of the strength of petitioner's evidence: The Court noted that it had reviewed the record on appeal and the briefs filed in the Court of Appeals and found no circumstance warranting liberality or leniency for the petitioner. The trial judge's decision had already decried petitioner's failure to comply with orders intended to accelerate proceedings and had succeeded in postponing hearings numerous times on trivial grounds. Furthermore, there was no clear showing of any substantial error committed by the trial judge in his judgment that would justify a reversal or remand of the case. The Court's role is to review errors of law, not to re-evaluate evidence unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion or manifest error.
Main Doctrine
Motions for extension of time to file briefs must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be extended. Failure to do so, absent a showing of good and sufficient cause, warrants the dismissal of the appeal. The granting of extensions is a matter of sound judicial discretion and parties cannot assume they will be granted.