Cledera v. Sarmiento
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Private respondents, employees of the provincial government of Camarines Sur paid from the road and bridge fund, had their positions abolished by Resolution No. 176, series of 1968. They filed Civil Cases Nos. 6591 and 6763 for prohibition and/or mandamus with damages, seeking reinstatement and back salaries. Procedural History: After pre-trial, the cases were to be decided jointly based on stipulations and evidence. Private respondents moved to reopen the cases to present additional evidence (1969-70 budget and plantilla), which was initially denied. They filed a motion for reconsideration of this denial, which lacked a notice of hearing. The respondent Judge, despite the lack of notice, granted the motion for reconsideration, reopened the cases, and allowed the presentation of additional evidence, stating the abolition of items was done in bad faith. Subsequently, the respondent Judge rendered a decision in favor of the private respondents, declaring Resolution No. 176 void and ordering reinstatement and back salaries. The Petition: Petitioners (Provincial Governor, Vice Governor, Provincial Board Members, Provincial Engineer, and Province of Camarines Sur) filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction seeking to nullify several orders: (a) orders allowing reconsideration of the denial to reopen and admitting additional evidence; (b) order granting execution; (c) order denying reconsideration of the execution order; and (d) the writ of execution itself. The core issue revolved around the validity of motions for reconsideration filed without proper notice of hearing, particularly concerning the motion for reconsideration of the decision which led to the order of execution.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to and granting the motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to reopen the cases, despite the alleged defect in the notice of hearing. Whether the order granting execution, the order denying reconsideration thereof, and the writ of execution were validly issued, considering the alleged defect in the notice of hearing accompanying the motion for reconsideration of the main decision.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the questioned orders and the writ of execution, lifted the preliminary injunction, and dismissed the petition. The Court held that the orders of November 26, 1969, December 4, 1969, July 17, 1970, and July 29, 1970, as well as the writ of execution dated July 22, 1970, were validly issued.
Ratio Decidendi
On the validity of the orders allowing reconsideration of the denial to reopen: The Court found that the petitioners, through their counsel, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amador, were estopped from questioning the validity of the order granting reconsideration of the denial to reopen due to their failure to file an opposition to the motion for reconsideration, despite being given an opportunity to do so. This failure constituted an abandonment or waiver of their right to challenge the validity of the motion and the subsequent order. The Court noted that the respondent Judge indicated he would have corrected his mistake had an opposition been filed. Furthermore, the order denying the reopening was considered interlocutory and could be rectified by the Judge motu proprio before additional evidence was presented. On the validity of the order of execution and related orders: The Court sustained the respondent Judge's rejection of the petitioners' contention that their motion for reconsideration of the decision, filed on June 8, 1970, substantially complied with the rules. The Court emphasized that the requirements of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 in relation to Section 2 of Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court are mandatory. The notice of hearing accompanying the motion was fatally defective because it failed to indicate the place and time of hearing, making it "worse than no notice at all." The Court reiterated that a motion without the requisite notice of hearing is a "useless scrap of paper" that does not toll the period for appeal. The decision dated April 27, 1970, therefore, became final and executory on June 11, 1970, thirty days after the petitioners received it on May 12, 1970. The filing of a defective motion for reconsideration did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal. The Court distinguished the present case from Sun Un Giok vs. Matusa and Inesin et al., vs. Canonoy, et al., noting that in those cases, the defects were either cured by subsequent actions of the court or justified by circumstances not present in this case, such as the inability to ascertain the court's session dates. The Court stressed that the rules are clear and mandatory, and any deviation would undermine the stability of jurisprudence and the finality of judgments.
Main Doctrine
The mandatory requirements of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 in relation to Section 2 of Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court regarding notice of hearing for motions for reconsideration are non-negotiable. Failure to comply renders the motion a mere scrap of paper, does not toll the period for appeal, and consequently, the judgment becomes final and executory.