Arrow Transportation Corporation v. Kintanar
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Salvador B. Japitana applied for a certificate of public convenience to operate 20 units of PU automobile service in Cebu. Notices were published, and no opposition was filed, leading to an ex parte hearing before Commissioner Filomeno C. Kintanar. A decision was rendered on April 30, 1970, ordering the issuance of the certificate. Procedural History: Arrow Transportation Corporation, an existing operator, filed a motion for reconsideration on May 16, 1970, alleging it was an affected party but had not received notice of the application or hearing. The Public Service Commission en banc granted this motion on June 18, 1970, vacating the April 30, 1970 decision and remanding the case for a de novo hearing with notice to Arrow Transportation. The Petition: On July 21, 1970, Japitana sought an extension to register the 20 units granted, claiming he only had 5 units available. Arrow Transportation opposed this, arguing the June 18, 1970 order vacated the original decision, leaving no basis for an extension. Respondent Commissioner issued an order on August 5, 1970, granting the extension. Arrow Transportation's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction.
Issue(s)
Whether the order dated August 5, 1970, granting respondent Japitana an extension of time to register his PU automobile units, was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Whether the order of August 5, 1970, could be considered a provisional permit.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari, set aside the order dated August 5, 1970, and remanded the case for further proceedings in accordance with the Commission en banc's order dated June 18, 1970. Costs were against the private respondent.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court held that the order of August 5, 1970, was issued with grave abuse of discretion. This is because the order purported to extend the period for the implementation of a decision that had already been vacated and set aside by the Public Service Commission en banc in its order of June 18, 1970. The purpose of vacating the decision was precisely to allow Arrow Transportation Corporation to file its opposition and present its evidence. Therefore, there was no existing decision upon which an extension for registration could be granted. The Court emphasized that it is pointless to speak of extending the period for registration of units under a decision that had become non-existent for that purpose. On Issue 2: The Court clarified that the order of August 5, 1970, could not be considered a provisional permit. The Court stated that it is pointless to speak of the authority of the Public Service Commission to grant provisional permits for the operation of public utilities because no such provisional permit was given in this instance. The order was simply a grant of extension of time to register units based on a decision that no longer existed for that purpose. Considering the order as a provisional permit would be inconsistent with the Commission en banc's resolution to set aside the decision and order a de novo hearing with notice to the oppositor. The arguments regarding the need for increased transportation facilities and petitioner's alleged monopolistic intent were deemed matters for the Public Service Commission to address during the reopened hearing.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court held that an order granting an extension of time to register public utility units, based on a decision that had been previously vacated and set aside by the Commission en banc, is null and void. Such an order lacks legal basis because there is no existing decision to extend the implementation period for, and it effectively disregards the Commission's own order for a de novo hearing. This action was deemed a grave abuse of discretion.