Lucas v. Mariano
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns ownership and possession of a parcel of land, Lot No. 6-B-2, which the petitioners claim was erroneously or fraudulently included in Original Certificate of Title No. 994, issued in 1917. The petitioners assert continuous possession of the land since time immemorial, even prior to the Torrens title registration. The respondents, conversely, are the registered owners of the land, holding titles derived from the original registration. The petitioners sought a declaration of ownership, reconveyance of the land, and cancellation of the transfer certificates of title held by the respondents. 2. Procedural History: The case has a complex procedural history involving multiple orders and reconsiderations. Initially, the Court of First Instance dismissed the petitioners' complaint on September 16, 1965, based on the admission that the land was registered under a Torrens title and that adverse possession is ineffective against such a title. A motion for reconsideration was denied on November 23, 1965. A second motion for reconsideration was filed, and on September 6, 1966, the court set aside the dismissal order, apparently recognizing the allegations of fraud and the need for trial. However, on December 1, 1966, the court issued another order dismissing the case, this time on the ground that the action for reconveyance based on fraud was barred by the statute of limitations, as the alleged fraud was discovered in 1930, not 1964 as claimed. The petitioners appealed this December 1, 1966 order. The respondents then filed a motion for reconsideration of an order that had given due course to the appeal, arguing that the appeal was filed out of time. The trial court, in an order dated May 30, 1968, granted the respondents' motion, reconsidered its previous order, set aside the due course given to the appeal, and declared the dismissal order final and executory. 3. The Petition: The petitioners seek a writ of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with preliminary injunction. They contend that the respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the May 30, 1968 order, which declared their appeal untimely and the dismissal order final. Specifically, they argue that the December 1, 1966 order of dismissal was a new appealable order, distinct from the earlier September 16, 1965 order, and that their appeal was filed within the reglementary period from the receipt of the December 1, 1966 order and its subsequent denial of reconsideration. They pray for the Supreme Court to set aside the May 30, 1968 order, compel the respondent judge to give due course to their appeal, and prohibit any further action to implement the dismissed order.
Issue(s)
Whether the 30-day reglementary period for appeal should be reckoned from the original 1965 dismissal or the subsequent 1966 dismissal order. Whether the petitioners' motions for reconsideration were pro-forma and thus failed to toll the appeal period. Whether Mandamus should lie to compel the trial court to give due course to the appeal despite the perceived lack of merit in the main action.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Supreme Court found that the order of dismissal dated September 16, 1965, had become final and executory. The Court agreed with the private respondents that petitioners' second motion for reconsideration was pro forma and, consequently, did not suspend the period to appeal from the order of dismissal or the order denying the first motion for reconsideration.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the trial court's theory of 'automatic reinstatement' of the first dismissal order was incorrect. By issuing the order of September 6, 1966, which specifically set aside the September 16, 1965 dismissal and set the case for pre-trial, the court effectively 'wiped away' the first dismissal. Therefore, when the court issued the December 1, 1966 order, it constituted a newly appealable order. Applying the 'Language of the Law' regarding reglementary periods, the petitioners would technically have a fresh 30-day period from the receipt of the December 1, 1966 order to file their appeal, provided no other procedural bars existed. On Issue 2: The Court ruled that the petitioners' second motion for reconsideration dated January 25, 1966, was pro-forma. Under Philippine jurisprudence, a second motion for reconsideration that merely iterations and reiterations the same points and arguments from the first motion, without raising new issues, is a dilatory strategy. Such a motion does not suspend the reglementary period to appeal. Even though the trial court had temporarily set aside the dismissal, the underlying finality of the first order (due to the pro-forma nature of the subsequent motions) could not be ignored in the final analysis of whether the case should continue. On Issue 3: The Court found that the underlying action for reconveyance was clearly barred by prescription and the principle of indefeasibility of Torrens titles. The petitioners admitted that OCT 994 was issued in 1917, and they filed their complaint only in 1964, more than 40 years later. Even assuming fraud, the four-year prescriptive period for reconveyance based on fraud had long since expired. Because the petitioners' claim of title had 'no chance of being sustained' even with further proceedings, the Supreme Court exercised its authority to terminate the litigation immediately rather than compelling a useless appeal. The interest of justice and public policy require that controversial rights in property be settled as soon as possible to promote stability.
Main Doctrine
A second motion for reconsideration, if pro forma and not raising new issues, does not suspend the reglementary period to appeal. The period for appeal is counted from the receipt of the order denying the first motion for reconsideration, or from the original order if the second motion is deemed pro forma.