Donnelly v. Villavicencio
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case originated from Civil Case No. 23466, an action for the foreclosure of a chattel mortgage. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment in favor of the defendant, Marc Donnelly, on his counterclaim. This judgment ordered the plaintiff, Rodolfo Villavicencio, to pay Donnelly P10.00 per day from July 23, 1954, until the return of the car, plus P300.00 in attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment, and it became final on August 5, 1957. Procedural History: Following the final entry of judgment on August 5, 1957, Marc Donnelly filed an action (Civil Case No. 70028) on July 8, 1967, to revive the judgment, well within the ten-year prescriptive period. However, summons could not be served on Rodolfo Villavicencio. The court dismissed this first revival action on March 10, 1969, without prejudice, due to failure to prosecute. Subsequently, on March 31, 1969, Donnelly filed a second action (Civil Case No. 76166) to revive the same judgment. Again, summons could not be served on Villavicencio despite diligent efforts. The Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IX, dismissed this second action on August 30, 1969, on the grounds of prescription, and denied Donnelly's motion for reconsideration on October 25, 1969. The Petition: Marc Donnelly filed this petition for review by certiorari seeking to reverse the dismissal orders of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The core issues raised are whether an action to revive a judgment is a quasi in rem action, allowing for service of summons by publication, and whether the second action for revival had prescribed. The petitioner argues that the second action was timely filed, either within the original ten-year period or tolled due to the inability to serve summons. The Supreme Court, however, focuses on the prescription issue, noting that the first revival action, filed within the ten-year period, suspended the prescriptive clock, and the subsequent dismissal without prejudice allowed for the timely refiling of the second action.
Issue(s)
Whether an action for revival of judgment is one quasi in rem and, therefore, service of summons may be effected through publication. Whether the second action for revival of judgment (Civil Case No. 76166) has already prescribed.
Ruling
The Court set aside the orders of the trial court dated August 30, 1969, and October 25, 1969, and directed the said court to send the case to the archives until private respondent's address is known or any property belonging to him is found. The Court found that the trial court committed a reversible error in dismissing Civil Case No. 76166 on the ground of prescription.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court clarified that an action to revive a judgment is a personal one. This principle was previously established in Aldeguer vs. Gemelo, et al., 68 Phil., 421. As a personal action, service of summons through publication is generally not permissible unless specific statutory authorization exists, which is not the case for a revival of judgment action seeking to enforce a personal obligation. The trial court, in this instance, did not rule on the motion for service by publication, thus making the issue not strictly justiciable for the purpose of overturning a direct ruling on it. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to reiterate this fundamental aspect of procedural law, emphasizing that the nature of the action dictates the appropriate modes of service of summons. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court found that prescription had not set in to bar the filing of petitioner's second action to revive the judgment. An action for the revival of a judgment prescribes in ten (10) years under Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code, counted from the date the judgment became final or was entered, as held in Vda. de Decena vs. De los Angeles, etc., et al., L-29317, May 29, 1971, 39 SCRA 95, 99. The filing of the first action (Civil Case No. 70028) on July 8, 1967, which was well within the ten-year period from August 5, 1957 (when final judgment was entered), effectively suspended the running of the prescriptive period pursuant to Article 1155 of the Civil Code. When the first case was dismissed 'without prejudice' on March 10, 1969, this meant the plaintiff could refile the complaint. The second action (Civil Case No. 76166) was filed on March 31, 1969, only twelve (12) days after receipt of the dismissal order for the first case. The dismissal of a case 'without prejudice' does not negate the interruptive effect of its filing; rather, it allows the plaintiff to avail himself of the remaining prescriptive period, or, as affirmed in Rapadaz Vda. de Rapisura vs. Nicolas, etc., et al., L-22594, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 798, 801, to refile the action. Furthermore, under Article 1108(2) of the Civil Code, the period of prescription is tolled when the defendant's address cannot with due diligence be ascertained or no property of his can be found, which was the predicament faced by the petitioner in both actions.
Main Doctrine
An action to revive a judgment is a personal action, not quasi in rem. The filing of an action to revive a judgment interrupts the ten-year prescriptive period. A dismissal without prejudice allows for the refiling of the action within the original prescriptive period. Prescription is also tolled when the defendant's address cannot be ascertained with due diligence.