Asian Surety & Insurance v. Relucio

G.R. No. L-32442 · 1972-10-23 · J. ANTONIO, J.: · Primary: Remedial; Secondary: Civil
REITERATION

Facts

1. The Antecedents: Asian Surety & Insurance Company, Inc. filed a collection case against Ricardo Relucio and Ong Ting for sums of money. A default judgment was rendered against them, ordering them to pay P3,000.00 with interest, P9,000.00 with interest, and P300.00 for attorney's fees. 2. Procedural History: Relucio moved to lift the default order and set aside the judgment, which was denied. He appealed this denial to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-22079). Meanwhile, the sheriff levied on Relucio's property, sold it to Asian Surety, and issued a certificate of sale. Relucio failed to redeem the property, leading to an Officer's Deed of Absolute Sale. Asian Surety then petitioned the Court of First Instance of Rizal to cancel Relucio's title and issue a new one in its name. This petition was granted, but Relucio appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 35864-R). The Court of Appeals reversed the Rizal court's order, finding the execution proceedings premature and void due to the pending appeal in the Supreme Court. Asian Surety's motion for reconsideration was denied. 3. The Petition: Asian Surety & Insurance Company, Inc. seeks review by certiorari of the Court of Appeals' decision and resolution. They argue the appellate court erred in holding that the Rizal court's order for title cancellation was an execution beyond its jurisdiction, that the writ of execution and subsequent proceedings were premature and unlawful, and that its decision had not become academic after the Supreme Court affirmed the default judgment in G.R. No. L-22079. The core of the petition is that the execution and sale of the property occurred before Relucio's appeal was perfected, and that his subsequent actions constituted acquiescence to the judgment.

Issue(s)

Whether the perfection of an appeal from an order denying a petition for relief under Rule 38 divests the trial court of jurisdiction to execute the original final judgment. Whether a party who partially satisfies a judgment and requests postponements of an execution sale is estopped from challenging the validity of the subsequent execution proceedings. Whether the Court of Appeals exceeded its authority by ruling on the validity of an execution writ issued in a separate case already pending before the Supreme Court.

Ruling

The Supreme Court reversed the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. It held that the Court of Appeals erred in its view of the factual setting and the applicable rules. The writ of execution was issued before the perfection of Relucio's appeal, and the judgment had become final and executory. Furthermore, Relucio's actions, including partial payments and requests for postponement of the execution sale, constituted voluntary acquiescence in the judgment, estopping him from challenging it on appeal. The Court also clarified that the rule on loss of jurisdiction upon perfection of appeal does not apply to appeals from orders denying petitions for relief from judgment.

Ratio Decidendi

On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Section 9 of Rule 41 to a Rule 38 proceeding. Under Philippine jurisprudence, specifically Sanchez v. Serrano, a petition for relief is an equitable remedy against a judgment that has already become final and executory. Therefore, the trial court's jurisdiction to execute that judgment is not divested by the mere perfection of an appeal from the denial of the relief sought. The only way to suspend or stay the execution of such a final judgment is by securing a writ of preliminary injunction under Section 5 of Rule 38. In this case, Relucio failed to obtain such an injunction, making it the ministerial duty of the court to proceed with the execution of the final judgment regardless of the pending appeal on the petition for relief. On Issue 2: The Court ruled that Relucio was precluded from challenging the execution on the ground of estoppel. Applying the principle in Verches v. Rios, the Court noted that a party who voluntarily executes, either partially or in toto, a judgment rendered against him, or who voluntarily acquiesces in its execution, cannot later appeal from it. Relucio made several cash payments toward the judgment debt and filed four separate written requests to the sheriff to postpone the auction sale to enable him to raise funds for full payment. By these actions, Relucio recognized the validity of the judgment and the execution process, thereby waiving his right to challenge the subsequent sale of the property to the petitioner. On Issue 3: The Court found that the Court of Appeals exceeded its authority by ruling on the validity of the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 51483. The appeal before the CA was limited to the order of the CFI Rizal in Case No. C-115 regarding the registration of title, not the main case's execution. Furthermore, the main case (G.R. No. L-22079) was already under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which extends to all matters incident to or connected with the suit. The CA also made a factual error by concluding that the execution was premature, when in fact the writ was issued, the levy made, and the sale conducted months before Relucio perfected his appeal to the Supreme Court.

Main Doctrine

A trial court loses jurisdiction over a case upon the perfection of an appeal, except for orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties that do not involve the litigated matter. However, this rule does not apply to appeals from orders denying petitions for relief from judgment, as the underlying judgment is already final and executory, and its execution can only be suspended by following the prescribed procedure under Rule 38.

Access audio review, related cases, codal links, and more.

Open LexMatePH →